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Preface 
This report presents and analyses the findings of a survey, MINE Norway.  MINE is an acronym for 
“Managing Innovation in the New Economy”.  As will be explained, MINE was a large international 
research project on innovation in private sector firms. The project was aimed at developing the 
conceptual framework of “games of innovation”, i.e. explaining how and why firms innovate.  The 
MINE Norway survey was part of the Work Package 1 (WP1) on “Innovation Processes” in a larger 
project at NIFU with the acronym GIPOL, or more formally as “Understanding innovation in a 
globalizing economy:  The Norwegian case”. This project was funded by the Research Council of 
Norway, through the research program “Vekstforsk”.  
 
The rationale for the project “Understanding innovation in a globalizing economy:  The Norwegian 
case” is the recognition that as a result of globalization, new ways of organizing production and 
new modes of innovation have emerged. Previously, innovation occurred mainly within single 
firms or in contractual relationships between firms. This “closed” mode of innovation has   
increasingly been substituted by more open modes of innovation and distributed knowledge 
networks. The goal of the project is to analyze this and develop a new conceptual framework 
relevant for innovation policy in Norway.  
 
Within this framework, the aim of WP1 on “Innovation Processes” is to study innovation 
processes in different types of Norwegian firms and industries. The results of this work are 
presented in this report, where Norwegian manufacturing firms are compared with Asian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms.  This comparison was made possible because the project was 
given access to the data from the main MINE project of the Ecole Polytechnique of Montreal, for 
which we would like to thank professor Roger Miller. We would also like to thank Mr Jon 
Vigrestad for providing input to the report, who at the time of the MINE Norway survey was done 
in 2008, worked as chief analyst at the Federation of Norwegian Industries.   
 
The report has been written by Helge Godø of NIFU, in collaboration with Pål Børing. 
 
Oslo, March 2011 
 
Sveinung Skule 
Director 
 
Taran Thune 
Research director 
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1 Introduction: Innovation in a globalized world 
economy 
In a highly competitive and increasingly globalized economy, the successes of Asian firms have been 
a topic of debates and a source of political tension and envy (and admiration) for decades. One of the 
earlier1 signs of these successes was the Japanese textile industry in the 1930s, which rapidly 
established a world leadership. Although this hegemony was disrupted during World War II and for a 
period afterwards because of the massive wartime destruction of Japan, Japanese companies 
gradually reemerged as highly successful in the 1960s. Toyota is of these, now the world’s largest 
automotive manufacturing company. Toyota has its ancestry in the textile industry that developed in 
Japan in the 1930s, an ancestry that Toyota shares with other Japanese companies that have 
subsequently developed and become large multinational industrial corporations, such as Suzuki. The 
core of Toyota’s success in textile manufacturing was due to a number of technological innovations 
developed by the founder, Sakichi Toyoda (1867-1930, also referred to as the “King of Japanese 
inventors”) , which increased the productivity and quality of textile production dramatically.  
 
The success story of Toyota has been emulated by other Asian companies; in recent decades this has 
become apparent in the so-called “newly industrialized” countries, such as South-Korea, Taiwan and 
People’s Republic of China. In this report, the focus will be set on these three countries in a 
comparative perspective, i.e. manufacturing firms in these countries  will be compared with the same 
type companies in Norway and a category of firms which will be called “Euro-American” firms, as will 
be elaborated soon. 
 
The simplistic explanation of the success of Asian firms is their low labour costs and a work culture, 
with emphasis on diligence and discipline. These aspects are often reported by Western media, by 
investigative journalists, e.g. reports from “high-tech sweat-shops” in China were young female 
workers from rural areas work as a modern type of indenture labour, living in crammed company 
dormitories and work for 12 hours a day or more, without holidays or days off – all this done at pay 
rates that are a fraction of what factory workers in Europe or North-America earn. However, these 
aspects do not explain why an increasing number of Asian firms are highly innovative in terms of 
technology and product development, i.e. the main reason why these companies are highly 
competitive and have become successful in the global markets. Unfortunately, poor and inhumane 
working conditions and low pay are prevalent in many other parts of the world outside Asia, even in 
some sectors of European and North-American economies this is rampant and it does not lead to an 
increase in innovation: Illegal immigrants work in fruit orchards in Spain and California, or leather 
work factories in Italy or Romania – and this does not contribute much to innovation. Hence, on a 
more general level, the interesting question is how firms in the increasingly globalized economy 
strive to succeed – and what they do for creating and promoting innovations, and, closely related to 
                                                          
1  Europe has imported technologically advanced manufactured goods from the Far East for millennia, such 
as porcelain and silk. In fact, the “Silk Road”, the main historical trade route between China and Europe, 
has its ancestry back to the Han dynasty (206 B.C-220 A.D). 
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this, how they understand and perceive, analyze, interpret and plan their innovation strategy and 
related activities.  
 
One analytical approach to this is the conceptual framework of “games of innovation” (Floricel & 
Dougherty, 2007; Miller & Floricel, 2004, 2007). Although this conceptual framework has some 
resemblance to others in innovation theory, such as the notion of “technological regimes” (Geels, 
2002; Rip & Kemp, 1998) and “innovation regimes” (Godoe, 2000, 2006) – and a somewhat broader 
conceptual framework of “innovation journey” (Ven, Polley, Garud, & Venkararaman, 1999), the 
conceptual framework of “games of innovation” puts more explicit emphasis on the dynamic and 
strategic aspects related to innovation activities, which may explain why the term “games” has been 
chosen as a designation, i.e. the dynamic connotation that one associates with something that is 
called a game. Although using the term “game” in this context may be considered as a misnomer 
because a game is usually associated with activities pursued for fun, leisure and pleasure, i.e. an 
activity where entertainment2 is set in focus,  the term “games of innovation” relates to the 
commonsensical understanding of “game” as a type of activity where there is an element of 
competition between the participants for attaining a certain goal – and that the actions and 
interactions involved are defined according to a set of rules. In other words, “game” should be 
understood in a metaphorical sense, somewhat similar to the notion of “innovation journey”. The 
conceptual framework of games of innovations is, however, different from “game theory”. 3 
 
The analyses presented in this report are based on data collected in the MINE project, which had its 
main base at Ecole Polytechnique in Montreal, Canada, until 2010, when this part of the project was 
finished4. MINE is an acronym for “Managing Innovation in the New Economy”. The focus of MINE 
has been on innovation strategies and processes in successful and innovative private sector 
companies, aimed at characterizing challenges facing firms because of the emergence of what was 
initially termed as the “New Economy” (Miller & Floricel, 2004). From around 2005, the MINE project 
designed and undertook a survey, which by 2009 had obtained 940 respondents in many countries, 
as will be explained in the next chapter, chapter 2. The MINE Norway5 survey, which was done in 
2008, came in addition, so the data matrix used in the analyses presented in this report is based on a 
total of 1,005 respondent firms. 
 
In this report, the results from the analyses of data from the MINE survey will be presented in a 
comparative perspective, i.e. a comparison of Asian manufacturing firms with Norwegian and “Euro-
American” manufacturing firms. These three categories of firms and the procedures used in analyses 
will be presented and explained in chapter 2. The topics that will be presented in this report are:  
                                                          
2  Game is of course also an industry, as evident in cities such as Las Vegas or Macau, or in global events such 
as the Olympic Games or the European Tour de France. 
3  Game theory is a branch of mathematics that attempt to provide formal (stylized) explanation of strategic 
choice in situations of competition and conflict, such as the concepts of zero sum game or cooperative 
games, etc. 
4  The home page of MINE, www.minesurvey.polymtl.ca, was closed down early in 2011. 
5  This research is part of a larger project, GIPOL, funded by the Research Council of Norway. 
 
 
9 
 
- Firm performance 
- Perception of contextual factors 
- Value creation capability of the firm 
- Innovation awareness in the organization  
- Innovation strategy processes and decision making   
- Strategies and practices for innovation, with the following sub-topics: 
o Exploration activities 
o Decision-making and portfolio management  
o Policies and practices relevant for innovation projects 
o Commercialization practices 
The purpose of this report is to find out if Asian companies, which have enjoyed considerable success 
during the past decades in an increasingly globalized and competitive economy, differ in terms of 
their innovation processes and how they innovate – the way they think, plan and work with 
innovation. In the material presented in this report, the manufacturing firms that participated in the 
MINE survey are fairly similar in terms of performance, although Asian firms seem to have a slightly 
better overall performance in terms of criteria used for business success. Based on these criteria, one 
may suggest that there are numerous ways of obtaining business success, and the rest of the report 
will focus on what these differences are.  
 
As will be shown, the firms differ in terms of their perception of contextual factors (chapter 4). The 
analyses of the material suggest that Asian firms are more market oriented in their outlook, however, 
this is combined with a high awareness of competition and technological development outside the 
firm. Norwegian manufacturing firms, in contrast, have a stronger technology oriented outlook. Euro-
American firms are similar to Asian firms in their emphasis on markets, however, this emphasis is not 
so distinct as their Asian counterparts.  
 
The topic of value creation capability of the firm (chapter 5) provides an insight into how the firms 
that participated in the MINE survey perceive the potential of their own firm. The analyses of the 
material from this part of the survey showed a high degree of commonality between the firms; hence 
the differences must be characterized as slight. In spite of this, there are some distinctions: Asian 
firms are slightly more customer focused in their understanding. In contrast, Norwegian 
manufacturing firms seem to have a higher focus on techno-economic aspects of their firm. Euro-
American firms are in a way similar to the Norwegians, however, they have a stronger focus on their 
firms’ products.  
 
The topic of innovation awareness in the organization (chapter 6) may provide an insight into the 
“innovation culture” or “innovation climate” in the firm, i.e. to what extent and how innovation is 
placed on the agendas of the firms and in the minds of individual employees. The analyses of the 
material from this part of the MINE survey showed that Euro-American firms are distinctly different 
from Asian and Norwegian firms, i.e. that Asian and Norwegian firms have some commonality in 
terms of innovation awareness in their organizations. Both categories of firms put emphasis on 
interpretation of innovation, however, whereas Norwegian firms attach importance to aligning this 
with formal management processes, Asian firms attach this to individuals within the organization and 
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their interpretations of innovation. In contrast, Euro-American firms put emphasis on communication 
and action as important for innovation awareness in the organization.  
 
Contrary to what management science (Robert G.  Cooper, 1996; Robert G Cooper, Edgett, & 
Kleinschmidt, 2000) extoll about the importance of top management attention and strategy thinking 
related to innovation, the MINE survey on innovation strategy processes and decision making 
(chapter 7) suggests that this is not the case: All firms are similar in that innovation is neither high on 
the agendas of top management – nor is innovation an important topic for senior managers. 
Compared to the results obtained on innovation awareness (chapter 6), these observation may seem 
puzzling. However, this may be the result of how decision making is done. The results indicate that in 
Asian firm, NPD-teams (New Product Development teams) are given high autonomy and empowered 
to make decisions that are related to innovation. In other words, innovation is delegated to specialist 
entities. In Norwegian firms, a similar type of delegation may be observed: Business Units (BUs) are 
responsible for NPD. Euro-American firms are similar to Asian firms, i.e. NPD-teams are put in charge, 
but not so strongly as in Asian firms.  
 
The topic of strategies and practice for innovation (chapter 8) cover four sub-topics. The first one is 
about exploration activities.  Together with commercialization, exploration activities is perhaps the 
most interesting and significant issue in contemporary innovation research. Being able to select the 
“right” idea for innovation development is seen as the most important success criterion for firms: No 
matter how excellent or perfect a subsequent product or service development is, a poor idea will just 
become a poor new product or service; however, a good idea may survive in spite of a poor product 
or service development. The notion of “Fuzzy Front End” of innovation (Robert G Cooper, et al., 
2000; Gordon, Tarafdar, Cook, Maksimoski, & Rogowitz, 2008; Koen et al., 2001) has gained 
increasing interest among innovation strategy managers, reflecting the emphasis that is put on this.  
The responses made in the MINE survey suggest clear-cut differences between the three categories 
of manufacturing firms: Whereas Asian firms may be characterized as having an extrovert outlook in 
their exploration activities, Norwegian and Euro-American firms are introvert in their outlook. To a 
much larger extent than the other categories of firms, Asian firms orient themselves to sources 
outside the firm, such as suppliers, external experts and academic community, industrial networks, 
etc. Norwegian and Euro-American firms, in contrast, focus on leveraging resources within the firm in 
their exploration activities. 
 
The second sub-topic on strategies and practice for innovation is on decision-making and portfolio 
management (chapter 8.2), i.e. mainly what on happens and what is done once an idea is selected 
and implemented . The results obtained from the analyses indicate commonalities in many variables 
between the three categories of firms. The firms are also similar because a multitude of strategies 
seems to exist. However, there are some distinctions: Asian firms, more so than the other two 
categories of firms, emphasize empowerment of middle managers and use of portfolio management 
approach in innovation activities. 
 
The third sub-topic on strategies and practice for innovation is on policies and practices related to 
innovation activities. As with decision-making and portfolio management, analyses of the topic of 
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policies and practices also showed that there are many similarities between the three categories of 
firms. Still, in some aspects, there are differences: Asian firms emphasize the importance of using a 
rigorous and experimental approach at all stages of product development in order to secure success. 
This attitude is also shared by Euro-American firms. In contrast, Norwegian firms seem to favor a 
different approach because they put emphasis on reusing successful solutions and components from 
earlier development projects (“object orientation”) and importing proven solutions from sources 
outside the firm. 
 
The fourth sub-topic on strategies and practice for innovation is on commercialization practices. As 
with selection, commercialization is seen as the most important issue in contemporary innovation 
research. This is about “getting the prototype out of the lab and into the market”. The results 
obtained by the analyses suggest that Norwegian firms “deviate” from the other categories of firms, 
mainly because they, in comparison with the other two categories of firms, may be characterized as 
fragmented and “frugal” because only a few aspects are given high priority. In contrast, the 
commercialization practices of Asian and Euro-American firms appear to be strong, cohesive and 
comprehensive.  The methodological aspects related to the findings of the survey and the analyses 
done with the data will be elaborated in chapter 2, but the sample of firms that were recruited as 
respondents to the MINE-survey was a strategic sample (in contrast to a random sample), because an 
important criterion for selecting respondents was that their firms were successful, both in terms of 
innovation and other attributes related to business success.  
 
The interesting question is: If all the firms that responded to the MINE survey and that were analyzed 
for this report have enjoyed business success, do the differences matter? Clearly, one may assume 
that the firms are participants in the same or fairly similar types of “games of innovation” because 
they are all homogeneous according to the broad categories of NACE6. In order to approach this 
question, we need to have some type of understanding or interpretation of what the differences 
imply. In the concluding chapter of this report (chapter 9) this will be a topic of discussion. However, 
at this stage of the report some introductory points may be made. 
 
The rationale for the approach presented in this report is that globalization and the role of 
innovation in this may be understood by analyzing and comparing the “…role of shared cognitive 
frameworks in structuring social systems” (Miller & Floricel, 2007), i.e. exploring and comparing how 
firms from different parts of the world participate in their game of innovation. By participating in a 
specific game, the purpose and rules of this game will of course determine how a firm plays. But their 
strategy and practice will be influenced by their understanding and interpretation of the game they 
are participating in – and the dynamics they encounter in these, i.e. how they interpret and act on 
their perception of the game. Although the “reality” of the game in globalized markets ideally should 
be identical for all participants, the success of Asian firms raise the question of whether the “…shared 
cognitive framework” is different. Of course, one may presume that the games themselves are 
malleable due to various types of interventions that, either overtly or more unintentionally, will 
                                                          
6  NACE = Nomenclature statistique des activities economique dans la Communaute européenne, similar to 
SIC (Standard Industrial Classification), used for classifying firms according to the sector and branch they 
belong to. Further information: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/nace_all.html  
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change how the game is played and the “rules” of the game.  If so, are there salient and specific  
aspects that may explain, or at least be observed, in the performance of Asian firms during the last 
decade?  
 
Research on corporate organization (Fang, 2010; Hofstede, 2007; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkow, 
2010; Zhang & Dodgson, 2007) suggests that cultural factors make firms around the world different 
even if they participate in globalized markets and face each other as competitors on more or less 
equal footing, i.e. they participate in the same game of innovation. Cultural diversity is also an 
assumption in the conceptual framework of national systems of innovation (NSI) (Lundvall, 1992, 
1999 ; Nelson, 1992; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993), i.e. that nations differ in their innovation 
capabilities for a number of complex factors. This may explain why firms also have national and 
ethnic identities which is reflected in their “shared cognitive framework”, which in turn may 
influence (and explain) how they think, plan and act in terms of innovation. This, in turn, may explain 
their performance and contribute to a better understanding of why firms around the world approach 
globalization in different ways.  
 
One interpretation that may be made from the results presented in this report is that Asian 
manufacturing firms have a dominant strategy and practice that increase its exposure for ideas that 
may be conductive to promotion of radical innovations. In contrast, Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms have a dominant strategy and practice more oriented towards exploitation 
activities that will lead them towards incremental innovation as an outcome of their introvert 
orientation. Following March (1991), one could suggest that Asian manufacturing firms are more 
exploration oriented, in contrast to Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms that seem 
more exploitation oriented. A similar conceptual dichotomy has been developed by Ven et al. (1999) 
in their conceptual framework of “innovation journey”, in the concepts of divergence (similar to 
March’s “exploration”) and convergence (similar to March’s “exploitation”). Because of the contrast 
between Asian manufacturing firms on the one side and more “occidental” manufacturing firms on 
the other, one may be tempted to ask if this divide reflect cultural factors, i.e. general norms and 
values of the society of the firms. This is an assumption in the theory of “innovation games” (Miller & 
Floricel, 2007). One may also point to framework conditions, e.g. industrial policy regimes in the 
People’s Republic of China,  Korea and Taiwan that put great emphasis on scientific and technological 
research directed to development of an advanced industry. These broad topics, although interesting, 
are outside the scope of this report.  Still, if the interpretation that Asian firms are more exploration 
oriented is considered satisfactory, and if this may be accepted as an explanation of why Asian firms 
are so innovative, this aspect should be of interest to innovation research – and, ultimately, for 
innovation policy.  
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2 The comparative approach 
2.1 The MINE survey 
The analyses presented in this report are based on data collected in the MINE project, which had its 
main base at Ecole Polytechnique in Montreal, Canada, until 2010, when this part of the project was 
finished7. MINE is an acronym for “Managing Innovation in the New Economy”. The now retired 
professor Roger Miller of Ecole Polytechnique was its project leader. MINE had its main funding from 
the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and collaborated with the Industrial 
Research Institute8 (IRI) of Washington, USA. IRI is a membership organization for promoting 
innovation activities and R&D in private sector companies and federal laboratories, mainly in the 
USA, but many of its members are European and Asian multinational corporations. In the beginning , 
MINE started up by doing qualitative interviews, mainly with IRI’s members, on innovation strategies 
and processes in private sector companies, aimed at characterizing challenges facing firms because 
of the emergence of what was then termed as the “New Economy” (Miller & Floricel, 2004). Then, 
around 2005, the MINE project used the findings from these interviews as input to design a survey, 
which by 2009 had obtained 940 respondents in many countries, as will be explained below. A copy 
of the English9 version of the questionnaire is enclosed this report as Appendix 1. The MINE Norway10 
survey, which was done in 2008 as a web-survey, came in addition, so the data matrix used in the 
analyses presented in this report is based on a total of 1,005 respondent firms. 
 
2.2 Rationale of strategic sample 
The criterion used for recruiting the respondents to the MINE survey was strategic, i.e. not random 
sample, which is the mainstream approach to doing surveys: Using the strategic sampling approach, 
firms with a track record of giving innovation high priority, such as members of the IRI, were 
approached and recruited to the MINE survey. The point of contact with these was usually top 
executives responsible for innovation, such as the CTO or the R&D vice-president, of the firm. In 
Norway, the firms were selected from a record kept by the Federation of Norwegian Industries11 on 
R&D and innovation in their member firms: The top 100 companies in this record, i.e. those firms 
that are most innovation intensive, were approached and asked to participate in the survey. In the 
main MINE survey, the network of IRI (Industrial Research Institute) of USA was used for recruiting 
respondents, cf.: http://www.minesurvey.polymtl.ca/ and articles written by Roger Miller and his 
associates in the MINE project (Floricel & Dougherty, 2007; Miller & Floricel, 2004, 2007). Strategic 
                                                          
7  The home page of MINE, www.minesurvey.polymtl.ca, was closed down early in 2011. 
8  Cf. http://www.iriweb.org/. IRI also publishes the journal Research Technology Management 
9  In Norway, a Norwegian language version of questionnaire was used. This was an exact translation from 
the English. The respondents in Norway were free to choose the English or Norwegian version. 
10  This research is part of a larger project, GIPOL, funded by the Research Council of Norway. 
11  We are grateful for the help and advice given by Mr. John Vigrestad, who until 2010 was a chief analyst at 
the Federation of Norwegian Industries, in doing the survey.   
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sampling is also known as non-probability sampling, because in this type of sampling, only a part of a 
population having a specific characteristic is selected. This sampling method will impose constraints 
on statistical generalization, an aspect that will be elaborated in section 2.5 below. The rationale of 
the strategic sample may be illustrated by an analogy: For studying the phenomenon of high 
performance marathon running, what provides the best data would be to study runners who are high 
performers (e.g., the 1000 fastest at the marathon distance); a random sample of all runners  (e.g. a 
sample of 1,000 marathon runners drawn randomly from a population of 1 million marathon 
runners) would probably provide interesting information, but would give less focused information on 
high performance runners; in such a random sample, the chances of drawing a high performer is just 
as low or high as the lowest performer (p= 0.001). 
 
2.3 Survey design and rationale 
In accordance with the assumptions in the conceptual framework of “games of innovation” (Floricel 
& Dougherty, 2007; Hopkins, Tidd, Nightingale, & Miller, 2011; Miller & Floricel, 2004, 2007; Tirpak, 
Miller, Schwartz, & Kashdan, 2006), the MINE survey is designed to elicit information on how firms 
participate in their specific game of innovation. More specifically, the questionnaire is designed so as 
to elicit and obtain information from people in key decision making positions in innovative firms. The 
respondents that were selected are responsible for innovation activities in a firm. Hence, an 
assumption in the design of the survey is that elicitation of how these key decision makers think, plan 
and act will give relevant information and data for explaining their firms’ innovation activities. The 
design of the MINE questionnaire is shown in Figure 2.1.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Design of MINE questionnaire 
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As shown in Figure 2.112, the questionnaire is organized in seven “compartments” or main topics that 
are relevant for obtaining data on innovation processes, strategies and practices. The figure also 
gives an indication of causalities by arrows representing influences and, by this, a type of linearity of 
the elements that constitute innovation processes. The middle of the figure, the part that is 
delineated by the stippled lines, constitutes the conduct of the innovation process. As shown in 
figure 2.1, the questionnaire consisted of these parts: 
- I – Business conditions, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on a seven 
point scale going from “Totally disagree” to “Totally agree” to 32 statements, 
- II – Value creation for customers, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on 
a seven point scale going from “”Not important” to “Extremely important” to 12 
statements 
- III – Strategies for innovation, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on a 
seven point scale going from “”Not important” to “Extremely important” to 47  
statements – and in addition click on buttons for eight questions on more tangible 
data on the firm 
- IV – Organizing for innovation, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on a 
seven point scale going from “Totally disagree” to “Totally agree” to 38 statements, 
- V- Network for innovation, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on a 
seven point scale going from “”Not important” to “Extremely important”, or “Totally 
disagree” to “Totally agree”, to 15  statements – and in addition click on buttons for 
two questions on more tangible data on the firm 
- VI – Performance, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on a seven point 
scale going from “Worse than rivals” to “Better than rivals” to six statements– and in 
addition click on buttons for three questions on more tangible data on the firm, 
- VII – Practices for innovation, in which the respondents were asked to indicate on a 
seven point scale going from “Totally disagree” to “Totally agree” to 47 statements. 
Altogether, the questionnaire consisted of 197 statements, as explained above, and informants were 
asked to give more specific information on 13 issues. A copy of the questionnaire is enclosed as 
appendix 2 in this report.  The questionnaire would normally require 45-60 minutes of attention from 
a respondent ; none of the questions (statements) were of a nature that would require respondents 
to check into company records, etc., i.e. the “answers” were (are) in the minds of the respondents. 
 
The intention of asking respondents about these topics was to elicit how relevant decision makers for 
innovation activities think and act in their work. Of course, what they and the firms they work for 
actually do – or fail to do – may theoretically be something different. The research of Van de Ven et 
al. (1999) has suggested numerous discrepancies between “textbook ideals” and reality (“what we 
see”), i.e. their observations and other empirical material on how firms make decisions on 
innovations and how innovation effort and projects actually evolve deviate much from “textbook 
ideals” and their strong prescriptions. In the material from the MINE survey, the probability that 
                                                          
12  Source: MINE homepage, downloaded from www.minesurvey.polymtl.ca (now (2011) closed). 
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respondents gave answers according to “textbook ideals” or other standards of “political 
correctness” is of course pertinent, but does not seem reasonable or probable for a number of 
reasons. Although some innovation researchers such as Robert Cooper (Robert G Cooper, et al., 
2000) present  prescriptions of doing innovation activities according to the “Stage-Gate” approach 
seem to have some influence, there is no unified or coherent theory or tenets as to what the 
“textbook ideals” are. Second, there was no incentive in the survey for respondents to answer 
opportunistically or whatever they would think is “correct” or according to the “textbook ideals”13. 
Third, one may assume that the least complicated way to respond to a survey is to give answers 
according to his or her own understanding of reality. Hence, one may assume that the responses 
given provide a fairly accurate picture of how decision-makers think about innovation activities – and 
what they emphasize in their decision-making and their views on the firms’ various strategies, 
policies and practices related to innovation activities. 
 
The design of the questionnaire reflects assumptions that may be recognized as belonging to the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance-Paradigm (SCPP) of industrial organization theory (Bain, 1951), 
although in the publications from the MINE project, no explicit reference is made to SCPP. In SCPP, 
the basic assumption is that an industry’s performance, such as measured by volume of sale and 
other proxies that represent value creation, depends on the conduct of the firms, i.e. what the firms 
do and how they do this, i.e. the center part of Figure 2.1. The conduct in turn, depends much on the 
structure, i.e. external factors such as technology, regulations – and, of course, characteristics of the 
markets, such as demand, number of buyers and sellers, product differentiation, etc. Superimposing 
the SCPP on figure 2.1, one could say that: 
- Structure is represented by: I – Business conditions and II – Value creation for 
customers 
- Conduct is represented by: III – Strategies for innovation, IV – Organizing for 
innovation, and V- Network for innovation, 
- Performance is represented by: VI – Performance and VII – Practices for innovation 
An extension of SCPP to innovation theory would be that performance to a large extent reflects 
innovation capabilities of a firm and its ability to compete with others within the opportunities and 
constrains set by the SCPP that the firm belongs to.  
 
In the research done in the MINE-project, one of the published papers (Miller & Floricel, 2007) 
presents a review of the literature relevant for exploring and analyzing the conceptual framework of 
“innovation games”. In their approach, they have structured this into what they call “three 
theoretical pillars” of relevant innovation studies: 
- research on innovation systems, 
- theories about the role of shared cognitive frameworks in structuring social systems, 
- research on the sources of heterogeneity in innovation processes. 
 
                                                          
13  This is a type of comment that has been offered for the way Asian informants may respond, i.e. that they 
are “polite” and have an “eager to please” attitude and for this reason make responses that they think will 
please the researcher and comply with standards of correctness. 
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Of these, the most relevant in terms of answering the question of how firms make decisions on 
innovation activities is the second one, the one about the role of shared cognitive framework in 
structuring social systems, because these are related to actions and action rules. Miller and Floricel 
explain that this type of research is relevant because they focus on “..decision-making processes that, 
together with a capacity base, enable managers to develop and implement innovation strategies” 
(Miller & Floricel, 2007, p. 8). Accordingly, rules and conventions that prescribe what to do may 
provide blueprint for what kind of decisions that are actually made. Some of these are general and 
shared by “everyone” within a culture or a society, however, others are specific and related to the 
game of innovation that the firm participates in. 
 
According to Miller & Floricel, there are specific “rule of games” in innovation, i.e. that each type of 
innovation game have sets of “rules” that are unique for the firms that participate in these. In their 
mind, rules of the game “offer a clear path to implementation” in terms of innovation activities, 
which explains their suggestion that “rather than recommending concrete strategies and 
investments, the rules state ideal propensities to innovate and to create barriers, attack, or 
cooperate” (2007, p. 9). In justifying this, they attempt to make an analogy to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
(1889-1951) notion of grammar, i.e. “rules” that are embedded in a language and that people have 
to adhere to when they communicate.  According to the authors,  the “rules of the game” approach 
has more explanatory power than those that explain innovation activities in terms of life-cycles or 
waves (e.g. Schumpeter (1934 (1974)), Perez (2002)), or evolutionary, systemic approaches (e.g. 
Edquist et al.  ( 2004) and Lundvall (1992)). The role of rules in an innovation game is, according to 
Miller & Floricel that of forming a “coherent totality around the value creation process” (p. 10) – and 
this also explains the dynamic that is active in generation of heterogeneity. Accordingly, 
understanding innovations is a matter of understanding how firms interpret and apply rules when 
they play their game. This assumption is also shared by the conceptual framework of technological 
regimes (Godoe, 2000; Rip & Kemp, 1998). However, in the conceptual framework of “games of 
innovation”, these rules seem to emerge from contextual conditions, some of which are stable – 
others, more transient. These variations may in turn determine what type of game that emerge. 
There are three dimensions in these: 
- knowledge production dynamics, i.e. the flow of new, relevant knowledge, 
- structuring potential, i.e. the potential for firms to capture value 
- demand specificity, which refers to what type of demand and purchasing powers that customers 
have. 
 
In their model, these three dimensions are put on a tripartite, ordinal scale (high-average-low) matrix 
– and various combinations of the three dimensions and their value on the ordinal scale define 
different games. In theory, this may provide 27 different categories of innovation games, however, 
Miller & Floricel (2007) have identified 11 distinct games. In an earlier paper (Miller & Floricel, 2004), 
only eight games were presented, which means that criteria for what constitutes a game is flexible. 
According to the conceptual framework of  “games of innovation”, each game has what Miller & 
Floricel (2004, 2007) call a “dominant logic” for value creation – and, more interesting for us – rules 
that determine how innovation activities should be organized, i.e. organizational forms that are 
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related to the contextual conditions and “dominant logic of value-creation”. Hence, they spell out 
four sets of rules: 
- Innovation capability in terms of knowledge, engineering and management, and ability to 
transform and commercialize scientific knowledge, 
- Network skills, i.e. building relationships to external parties such as customers, investors, 
competitors, regulators, etc., 
- Competitive and collaboration strategies, which influence allocation of resources to doing 
innovation activities such as R&D and/or collaboration with other firms. Depending on what type 
of game the firm participates in, the R&D intensity for some is in the range of 40% of their 
revenues, while in others, this may be as low as 1-2 % of the revenues. 
- Internal organization of innovation activities, which varies according to what type of game the 
firm is playing. In some, innovation activities play an important role and have attention of top 
management; in others, this is something “taken care of” by a specialised unit such as  a R&D 
unit in the firm. 
 
According to Miller & Floricel, the conceptual framework of innovation games is an evolutionary 
model, hence dynamics of evolution are relevant for how games develop. In this, there are three key 
concepts: 
- variation, which is created by individual and corporate agents (2007, p. 25); in particular 
entrepreneurs play an important role in creating variation, but the rate of knowledge production 
is also an important source, 
- selection, which occurs because of the competition between ideas, technologies and firms, 
- retention, in which rules become institutionalized and create various types of path dependencies 
that constitute developmental trajectories.  
 
Looking more closely at the theoretical explanations given for justifying the conceptual framework of 
innovation games, the ambition seems eclectic, in the sense that they have attempted to assemble 
elements from a number of different theories on innovation for explaining something that resembles 
explanations that have been developed within the framework of sectorial systems of innovation 
(Godø, 2008). Miller and Floricel are explicit in pointing out that their use of the term “game” has 
nothing to do with the mathematical understanding such as in “game theory”, but their use of 
“game” as a metaphor has been inspired from sports, such as a game of soccer, where teams are the 
metaphorical equivalent of firms. However, the MINE survey is unique because it attempts to elicit 
information that reflects how key decision makers in firms think and practice innovation. One may 
suggest that the justification for doing the MINE-survey in which the purpose is to map how 
managers of innovation activities perceive and judge different aspects related to innovation may be 
parallel to asking a captain or a team coach of a sports team about how they play their game. This 
latter point is not spelt out or explained in this way, but it seems to be a fair interpretation of their 
suggestion that they want to “identify the rules of the game by measuring and comparing managers’ 
cognitive representations of the value-creation network, participants and roles, strategies and 
practices” (Miller & Floricel, 2007, p. 28). 
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2.4 Globalization 
In the research reported here , the approach has been different compared the one described above 
(Miller & Floricel, 2004, 2007), because the main focus is set on globalization and how innovative 
firms from different parts of the world participate in their game of innovation. In debates, both 
popular and public policy debates and in more academic research communities, the topic of why 
specifically Asian firms have shown themselves capable of competing with considerable success has 
been on the agenda for many decades, cf. Kline & Rosenberg  (1986) and Freeman (1988). A number 
of explanations for the success of Asian firms are put forward, such as Asian firms succeed because 
they are skilful in imitation, i.e. they are adept at reverse engineering of Western innovations (hence, 
Asians are “free-riders” ) and have skills and other capabilities in terms of manufacturing these 
imitations which make them competitive. The notion of undeveloped nations “catching-up”, which 
also often enter into explanations of the Asian success, is that these nations are able to succeed 
because of extraordinary efforts and second-mover advantages. Recently, the economic stagnation 
of the Japanese economy for the last decade has been used as an argument for the “catching-up”-
hypothesis. According to this, the Japanese have successfully caught-up with the rest of the world 
and has now encountered problems because the allegedly imitative strategy for Japan has reached 
its limit; Japan has entered a type of developmental “dead end”. A weakness of this argument is that 
it veils that Japanese companies are still very profitable and competitive, mainly because they are 
highly innovative, as is evident in a large number of Japanese companies in the automobile industry, 
in electronics and computers, in new materials, entertainment, etc. (e.g. Toyota, Sony, KyoCera, 
Nitendo, etc.). Japan’s economic stagnation and problems since the 1990s are mainly due to 
structural maladies of the Japanese domestic economy and society (e.g. aging population and low 
fecundity, etc.) – and an ineffective political system. 
 
The rationale for the approach presented in this report is that globalization and the role of 
innovation in this may be understood by analyzing and comparing the “role of shared cognitive 
frameworks in structuring social systems” (Miller & Floricel, 2007), i.e. exploring and comparing how 
firms from different parts of the world participate in their game of innovation. To extend the game of 
innovation metaphor: By participating in a specific game, the purpose and rules of this game will of 
course determine how a firm plays. But their strategy and practice will still be heavily influenced by 
their understanding and interpretation of the game they are participating in – and the dynamics they 
encounter in these, i.e. how they interpret and act on their perception of the game. Although the 
“reality” of the game in globalized markets ideally should be identical for all participants, the success 
of Asian firms raise the question of whether the “..shared cognitive framework” is different. Of 
course, one may presume that the games themselves are malleable due to various types of 
interventions that, either overtly or more unintentionally, will change how the game is played and 
the “rules” of the game.  If so, are there salient and specific cultural aspects that may explain, or at 
least be observed, in the performance of Asian firms during the last decade?  
 
Research on corporate organization (Fang, 2010; Hofstede, 2007; Hofstede, et al., 2010; Zhang & 
Dodgson, 2007) suggests that cultural factors make firms around the world different even if they 
participate in globalized markets and face each other as competitors on more or less equal footing. 
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Cultural diversity is also an assumption in the conceptual framework of national systems of 
innovation (NSI) (Lundvall, 1992, 1999 ; Nelson, 1992; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993), i.e. that nations 
differ in their innovation capabilities for a number of complex factors. This may explain why firms 
also have national and ethnic identities which is reflected in their “shared cognitive framework”, 
which in turn may influence (and explain) how they think, plan and act in terms of innovation. This, in 
turn, may explain their performance and contribute to a better understanding of why firms around 
the world approach globalization in different ways. Exploring this then became an objective of the 
analyses presented in this report. 
 
As pointed out earlier, the success of Asian firms has been a source of much debate among 
incumbent countries, i.e. Western countries, in Europe and North-America. Simultaneously, this has 
also become a source of pride to the ”winners”- Asian countries and in particular Asian firms that 
have succeeded in terms of profits, sales growth, market shares, etc. in globalized markets. In Europe 
and North-America, many of the explanations given (often used for justifying demands for trade 
protection policies14) imply that Asian industry has set plagiarism into system and that they are 
basically not capable of creativity and innovativeness, as Western industry. Although much of this 
may be characterized as “normal” partisan, ethnocentric rhetoric with associated nationalistic 
chauvinism, this may also be due to ignorance and cultural barriers. The normal perception of Asia in 
Western countries is that they are backward because there is little understanding of Asian culture 
and language. Hence the knowledge that Asian countries have a cultural and techno-scientific 
heritage that is advanced, based on millennia of highly educated people (Mokyr, 1990; Needham, 
1964), is not well appreciated. Innovation has always been a centrepiece in Asian culture, however, 
the perception of this may be obscured to many people in West because they understand Asia as 
traditionalistic and status-quo oriented. In Nordic countries, this is amplified by  an understanding 
that their culture is superior to all others, specifically what is termed as the Nordic model is seen as 
the best15, also in terms of innovation (Jensen, Johnson, Lorentz, & Lundvall, 2007). 
 
2.5 The analytical approach 
As indicated earlier, explaining the success of Asian firms in terms of low labor costs, hence also low 
price of products is too simplistic given the high quality and other attributes that indicate high degree 
of innovativeness and high level of knowledge embedded in the products. The purpose of this report 
                                                          
14  In 1987, in the “Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal” that involved a subsidiary of Toshiba and the Norwegian 
company Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk, trade protection activists in US were vocal in demanding sanctions 
against Japan. 
15  At the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2011, a high profile presentation of the “Nordic Model” 
was made by Mr. Jens Stoltenberg, the current prime minister of Norway. According to media, Mr. 
Stoltenberg was accompanied by the presidents of Finland and Iceland and the prime ministers of 
Denmark and Sweden – and their argument was the “Nordic Model” has proven itself to be robust and 
resilient to the financial crisis of 2009, with the underlying message of its superiority. A similar sentiment 
reflecting a belief on the superiority of the Nordic Model is evoked in the work done by a research group 
ESOP based at the University of Oslo (www.esop.uio.no). Of course, there are many merits to the Nordic 
Model, specifically its emphasis on social, economic and gender equality, but this should not automatically 
translate into total superiority, such as superiority in terms of innovation policy and strategy.    
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is to explore how management of innovation plays a role, i.e. what type of practices are used for 
promoting innovation in Asian manufacturing firms, as compared with European and North-American 
firms . The comparative approach chosen for this in the report may be termed triangular, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.2.   
 
Asian
manufacturing
firms
(142 responses)
Norwegian 
manufacturing 
firms 
(62 responses)
”Euro-American” 
manufacturing firms 
(229 responses)
 
Figure 2.2: Model of comparison used in analyses of the MINE survey data on innovation practices 
presented in this report 
 
In the material analyzed, we have responses made by informants from 142 Asian manufacturing 
firms (NACE category C, based on the Standard Industrial Classification SIC2007) in the MINE survey 
(76 firms from China, 38 firms from Korea, and 28 firms from Taiwan). The regional distribution of 
respondents (i.e. firms) in the MINE survey is shown in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1: Regional distribution of respondents participating in the MINE survey 
Region 
Total in the MINE 
survey 
NACE category C: 
Manufacturing 
Africa 1 0 
Asia 193 142 
Europe 208 122 
Of these: 
  Norway 65 62 
Other European countries 143 60 
North America 351 157 
Oceania 14 5 
South America 52 7 
Multinational 186 40 
Total 1005 473 
Note: Manufacturing firms are firms included in NACE category C, based on the Standard Industrial 
Classification SIC2007. 
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The respondents from the Asian manufacturing firms will be compared with two other groups of 
respondents: 
 
- Norwegian manufacturing firms, of which 62 firms were classified as belonging to the NACE C 
category, i.e. manufacturing firms, 
- Euro-American firms, i.e. a category consisting of 60 European firms (Norwegian and 
multinational firms are not included in this group), 157 firms from North America (63 firms 
from US and 94 firms from Canada), 5 firms for Oceania (Australia) and 7 firms from South 
America (Peru), in total 229 firms, all belonging to the NACE category C. 
The questionnaire used in the MINE survey was long – and not all respondents who participated in 
the survey and submitted answers responded to all the questions in the questionnaire. Hence, the 
response rate for individual questions varied around 80 to 90 per cent. In addition to this, there are 
methodological implications related to how the respondents were recruited – and which the readers 
should be made aware of. As indicated earlier (section 2.2), the MINE survey is based on a strategic 
sample, which is different from the “normal” approach in doing surveys, i.e. random sample. Hence, 
making statistical generalizations is limited. Still, the strategic sample used in the MINE survey is 
advantageous because the focus will be set only on successful firms, i.e. how key decision makers 
(the respondents) think, plan and act in terms of innovation and innovation activities. The Norwegian 
firms that participated in the survey are among the 100 highest innovation performing 
manufacturing firms in Norway. In our context, the underachievers and non-innovating firms are not 
interesting, because the purpose of the analyses presented in this report is to explore if, and to what 
extent, successful firms that participate in the globalized, competitive markets differ from each other 
– and to explain these differences. Non-innovating firms are in a sense irrelevant for this research. As 
will be shown, there are differences between the three categories of firms presented in this report 
that seem profound. In addition, there are questions related to the comparability of the material. 
The Asian countries from which the Asian firms that participated in MINE came from are large, both 
in scale and scope.  Hence the 142 Asian firms in the analyses of this report are sampled from a much 
larger population of manufacturing firms compared to the Norwegian. The same consideration will 
apply to the category “Euro-American” firms.  However, these finding will need much more research 
in order to establish the magnitude and full implications of these. This topic will be discussed further 
in chapter 9, in the conclusion. 
 
The triangular approach used in this report is illustrated in Figure 2.2. There are some rudimentary 
assumptions in this model: 
- The Norwegian firms are assumed to represent the type of work culture typical of what is 
known as the “Nordic” model, i.e. little hierarchy, emphasis on “democracy in work”, 
egalitarian interpersonal relationships, comparatively high degree of autonomy for individual 
employees in terms of decision making, generally high level of education and knowledge 
among the employees, etc. (Jensen, et al., 2007). The relationship between labor unions and 
management is basically considered as congenial and cooperation oriented. 
- The Euro-American firms (this category does not include Norwegian and multinational firms) 
are assumed to represent work organizations and cultures that are more formalized, 
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hierarchical and status oriented, hence more power and authority given to managers, 
compared with the “Nordic” type of model; relationships between labor unions and 
management are often antagonistic and the notion of worker autonomy and participation in 
management is weak. 
- The Asian firms are distinct because their cultural background and values are different from 
the Norwegian (Nordic) and the Euro-American firms, possibly with greater emphasis on 
Confucian norms and ethics in terms of respect for seniors and leaders, loyalty, diligence and 
discipline – representing a contrast to the other two categories of firms. The notion of 
paternalism is strong in management philosophy. Labor unions, if they exist, are generally 
weak and co-opted by the firm, however, high degree of loyalty and strong identity to 
company values are expected. 
 
The responses made to these statements in the MINE questionnaire (cf. section 2.3 above) were 
analyzed by using Principal Component Analysis, a type of factor analysis that creates new factors, or 
in this case, new components based on analysis of the initial (observed) variables, i.e. the responses 
made to each statement. In the analysis, this procedure was used separately for all the three 
categories of firms, i.e. an identical analysis of the three categories: Asian manufacturing firms, 
Norwegian manufacturing firms and Euro-American manufacturing firms. The results obtained were 
then put together, in tables, as will be shown throughout this report, with separate columns for each 
category of firms.  
 
The structure of this report is based on the structure of the questionnaire, hence there will be one 
chapter for each topic, or compartment, in the questionnaire, save two topics that have been 
omitted, i.e. part III – Strategies for innovation and part V- Network for innovation, mainly due to 
budgetary constraints in the project, which forced us to prioritize which parts of the material that 
would be most relevant for the research questions. As seen in figure 2.1, the parts that have been 
selected will constitute a chain of data consistent with the SCPP-model presented earlier (cf. section 
2.3), i.e. that parts selected will provide the analyses with data that cover all elements in the SCP-
approach.  However, the report will start with a presentation the data from part VI on firm 
performance. The reason for this is that the reader should be made aware of what kind of firms that 
have responded to the questionnaire, i.e. that these are exceptional in the sense that they are above 
average – they are high achievers in terms of innovation and other attributes that are associated with 
successful business enterprises that are innovative. This, of course, makes the analyses more 
challenging, because, performance of the firm, as a “dependent” variable of innovation, then 
becomes more complex and makes it more challenging to draw definite conclusions.  
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3 Firm performance 
In the MINE survey, data on firm performance indicators relevant for innovation were collected by 
asking informants how their firm’s performance compared relative to its competitors and a rough 
assessment of their firms’ sales growth and profitability the last three years, cf. Table 3.1 and Table 
3.2. As an extension of this, they were also asked to give more “objective” information on their firm’s 
sales and profitability, in the last section of the MINE questionnaire. Here, the respondents were 
asked to provide specific information on their firm, such as its number of employees, total sales, 
market share, international and national structure, sectoral and branch identity, etc. However, the 
quality of the data obtained in this last part of the questionnaire was poor because too few 
respondents answered. Furthermore, some of the data that was given in the open part of the 
questionnaire is hard to understand and interpret. For this reason, most of this type of data was not 
used, except for the information on country and sectorial category. 
 
Table 3.1: Firm performance – Respondents’ assessment (Section VII, part 1) 
How well is your firm doing, relative to 
competitors, in each of the following areas?  
Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing 
firms 
Scale: 1=Worse than rivals; 4=About equal; 
7=Better than rivals 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Growth rate of firm (or of the relevant SBU 
used in the survey) 
5,0 5 5,3 5 4,9 5 
Creation of customer value through 
innovation 
5,0 5 5,3 5 5,3 5 
Number of new businesses generated 
through innovation 
4,7 5 4,5 4 4,4 4 
Number of spin-offs and start-ups 
generated through innovation 
4,4 4 3,5 4 3,5 4 
Frequency of major new products releases 
4,8 5 4,3 4 4,6 4 
Proportion of revenues generated through 
new products 
4,7 5 4,5 4 4,7 5 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, respondents in the survey were asked to give their opinion on how well their 
firm is doing compared to its competitors, in a number of dimensions: 
- Growth rate of the firm 
- Creation of customer value through innovation 
- Number of new businesses generated through innovation 
- Number of spin-offs and start-ups generated through innovation 
- Frequency of major new product releases 
- Proportion of revenues generated through new products 
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The results obtained and shown in Table 3.1 are subjective assessments, which may raise 
methodological concerns as well as the question of what these data represent, because the topics 
covered by this table could plausibly be rendered more satisfactory by obtaining information from 
more “objective” sources, such as annual reports and company accounts, etc. Critics would perhaps 
suggest that people in general want to present themselves and the firm they work for as more 
successful than what is “objectively” the case.  On the other hand, why should informants respond 
willfully wrong ; who do they want to impress by doing so in an anonymous questionnaire? There 
were no incentives in the MINE survey to encourage specific type or direction of responses. 
Furthermore, one would expect that because of the way the respondent were recruited, i.e. the 
strategic sampling approach that selected firms with a high innovation track record, the outcomes 
shown in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 should not come as a surprise. As shown, most of the respondents, 
as measured both by mean (average) and median, indicate that their firms are somewhat ahead of 
their competitors; they are not far ahead, but still, moderately superior.  
 
Table 3.1 shows that the difference between the three categories of manufacturing firms is not large. 
However, within these slight variation, Asian manufacturing firms gave scores on their firms’ 
performance that were slightly better than Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms.  
These differences become much less distinct when comparison is made of the sales growth and 
profitability of the three categories of manufacturing firms, as shown in Table 3.2. As shown, Asian 
and Norwegian firms seem to have obtained a higher annual growth rate over the last three years; 
they are in the range of 10-20 percent annual sales growth, which is respectable and good in terms of 
sales growth. Still, in terms of net profits from sales and average return on investment (ROI), 
respondents from Norwegian firms indicate that their ROI was highest; Asian firms reported highest 
average net profits on sales over the last years, slightly more than their Norwegian counterparts. 
 
Table 3.2: Firm performance – Sales growth and profitability (Section VII, parts 2 and 3) 
Sales growth and profitability 
(part 2 and 3) 
Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing 
firms 
Scale: 1=Negative; 2=0-5%; 
3=5-10%, 4=10-20%; 5=20-40%; 
6=40% and over 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Average annual sale growth 
over the last 3 years 
3,9 4 3,8 4 3,3 3 
Average net profit on sales over 
the last 3 years 
3,6 3,5 3,4 3 3,0 3 
Average return on investment 
(ROI) over the last 3 years 
3,4 3,5 3,9 4 3,1 3 
 
Table 3.1 shows the results of a statistical exercise designed to identify in which areas there are 
statistically significant differences between the three categories of firms in terms of the dimensions 
explored in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. In each column in Table 3.3 we compare the mean values of the 
firm performance variables in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. We see for example from Table 3.1 that the mean 
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value of the number of spin-offs and start-ups generated through innovation among Asian firms (4.4) 
is higher than the corresponding mean value among Norwegian firms (3.5). The question is whether 
the difference is significant or not. Table 3.3 shows the conclusions from these calculations; this is 
based on a procedure explained in detail in Appendix 1 of this report. 
 
Table 3.3: Comparison of scores made by responding firms, statistical significance 
How well is your firm 
doing, relative to 
competitors, in each of 
the following areas? 
Sales growth and 
profitability? 
Difference Asian-
Norwegian firms 
Difference Asian-
Euro-American firms 
Difference Norwegian-
Euro-American firms 
Scale: 1=Worse than 
rivals; 4=About equal; 
7=Better than rivals 
Significance 
level 
satisfied at 
1 or 5 % 
Level at 1 
or 5 %? 
Significance 
level 
satisfied at 
1 or 5 % 
Level 
at 1 or 
5 %? 
Significance 
level 
satisfied at 
1 or 5 % 
Level at 1 
or 5 %? 
Growth rate of firm (or of 
the relevant SBU used in 
the survey)   No 
  No  No 
Creation of customer 
value through innovation   No 
5 % Yes  No 
Number of new 
businesses generated 
through innovation   No 
5 % Yes  No 
Number of spin-offs and 
start-ups generated 
through innovation 1 % Yes 
1 % Yes  No 
Frequency of major new 
products releases 5 % Yes 
  No  No 
Proportion of revenues 
generated through new 
products   No 
  No  No 
Scale: 1=Negative; 2=0-
5%; 3=5-10%, 4=10-20%; 
5=20-40%; 6=40% and 
over     
      
Average annual sale 
growth over the last 3 
years   No 1 % Yes 5 % Yes 
Average net profit on 
sales over the last 3 years   No 1 % Yes  No 
Average return on 
investment (ROI) over 
the last 3 years 10 % 
Yes, 
higher 5 % Yes 1 % Yes 
 
An assumption in the design of the MINE questionnaire is that firm performance is an outcome, i.e. 
the “dependent” variable, of all the aspects that influence the innovation processes and strategy of 
the firm. The tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show that although all firms think that they are slightly better 
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than their rivals in most of the dimensions which are relevant for characterizing success in business – 
and seem to enjoy a healthy level of profitability, some differences between the firms seem to exist, 
as pointed out by the statistical amplification presented in Table 3.1.  
 
The results presented above support the assumption of the MINE project that the firms that 
participated in the survey have good track record in terms of innovation performance – and that this 
has contributed to their profitability. Although some differences between the various categories of 
firms may be observed, as explained, the general picture is that the respondent firms are successful 
in an innovation perspective.  The question of if, and how, they differ in terms of innovation then 
becomes interesting in the global perspective adopted as the approach of this report. This will then 
be the main topic in the rest of this report: Are there differences between the three categories, 
Asian, Norwegian and Euro-American firm in the MINE survey in how they innovate? If so, what are 
these differences – and what do these imply?  
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4 Perception of contextual factors 
In games of innovation, a basic assumption is that the management, strategy and practices for firms 
are influenced by their understanding of the game, i.e. their perception and interpretation of their 
environment – and, ultimately, the markets they attempt to play in. In order to explore this, the 
MINE survey asked the respondents to indicate to what extent they agreed or disagreed to a series of 
statements related innovations relevant factors outside their firms.  
 
Factor analyses of the responses made show that although the differences between the three 
categories of firms are not sharp, there are nevertheless some differences which may be considered 
significant when comparing what may be termed as the dominant trend of firms, i.e. the first 
component that explains the largest percent of the variance: 
- Compared to the other categories of firms in this analysis, Asian firms emerge as more market 
oriented because they put strong emphasis on the importance of customers, users, academia 
and the technological environment of their firm. 
- In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms put greater emphasis on aspects that may be termed 
as a technology oriented outlook. 
- Euro-American firms seem more fragmented, but in their dominant trend, they emphasize some 
of the same aspects as the ones emphasized by Asian manufacturing firms.  
In attempting to interpret these observations, one may suggest that these differences indicate that 
Asian manufacturing firms are generally more extrovert in their orientation, compared to the other 
categories of firms. In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms seem to pay more attention and 
emphasize factors that may be considered as important with the technological regime that they 
belong to, i.e. a more introvert orientation. Euro-American manufacturing firms seem to be split 
between these two extremes, because they are more pluralistic. The results obtained from the factor 
analysis are shown in Table 4.1. 
 
In terms of the factors that influence innovation in the firms and the sector they operate in, the 
contrasts observed above are not so distinct. This interpretation is based on the results of the factor 
analysis shown in Table 4.2. In fact this shows what may be interpreted as some degree of consensus 
between the three groups of firms on many issues related to contextual factors: All firms seem to 
share a common outlook in recognizing the importance of developing products that interconnect 
with other products, because this is considered important for creating value for their customers. 
Hence, recognition of technical compatibility and interworking of products with others is emphasized 
as important by all firms. All firms are also similar in that they – in their dominant trend – do not 
consider regulatory approval and IPR as important for their innovation activity. All firms also seem to 
put little emphasis on the potential for economics of scale in production and the potential of 
harvesting economic benefits from process innovation. They also agree that economic constraints 
are important. The responses made by the informants indicate that in terms of their outlook, the 
dominant trend seems similar, i.e. firms share a similar common understanding of external factors 
that influence innovation, which indicates that in this aspect, their perception of the “game of 
innovation” is uniform. Table 4.2 shows the details of this. 
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Table 4.1: The nature of the sector in terms of customers and scientific and technical 
knowledge production 
Questions I a-b, 9 statements 
Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing firms 
  Component Component Component 
  1 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
Customers provide significant 
expertise about how our products 
operate 
0,656 0,058 0,068 0,098 0,861 0,044 0,771 0,321 -0,125 
The customers served by firms in 
our sector have very complex needs 0,701 -0,242 0,123 
-
0,007 0,822 0,327 0,801 
-
0,102 0,095 
Knowledge production in the 
academic fields relevant for our 
sector is very intense 
0,786 0,120 -0,063 0,740 0,040 0,812 0,053 0,086 
-
0,024 
Our sector contributes a lot of data 
ideas and papers to academic 
research 
0,700 0,229 0,090 0,896 -0,061 0,848 0,068 0,038 
-
0,179 
Our sector continually integrates 
many new systems and equipment 0,720 0,233 0,052 0,874 0,095 0,772 0,130 0,156 0,153 
New knowledge results mainly from 
intense interactions between firms 0,290 0,589 0,762 0,167 0,159 0,364 0,082 0,601 
-
0,077 
New technologies build on the 
latest technologies of other firms in 
the sector 
0,157 0,808 0,859 0,117 -0,033 0,093 0,075 0,823 0,068 
All firms in our sector rely on the 
same stable technological base -0,086 0,737 0,739 
-
0,314 
-
0,160 
-
0,170 
-
0,284 0,310 0,662 
New knowledge results from the 
gradual accumulation of experience 
inside firms 
0,270 0,385 0,655 -0,001 0,182 0,046 0,136 
-
0,166 0,870 
Percent of total variance explained 
by the component 34,1 17,1 27,7 24,6 15,6 30,3 14,6 12,3 11,9 
Number of iterations for rotation to 
converge 3 4 5 
Number of components generated 2 3 4 
Percent of variance explained by 
these components 51,3 67,9 69,1 
Observations 142 63 228 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
       Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
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Table 4.2: Factors that influence innovation  
Questions I c, 10 statements  
Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing firms 
  Component Component Component 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Regulatory approval is a 
critical prerequisite for 
commercializing any new 
product 
0,121 -0,122 0,827 0,173 0,045 0,858 0,164 0,051 0,834 0,096 
-
0,053 
Time and resources needed 
to obtain regulatory approval 
deter "me too" innovations 
0,143 0,091 0,858 -0,105 
-
0,074 0,772 0,057 0,114 0,873 0,091 0,057 
Intellectual property 
protection enables firms to 
capture all the value from 
innovations 
0,429 0,278 0,457 -0,427 0,548 0,118 0,091 0,037 0,375 0,690 
-
0,188 
The technologies produced in 
our sector are used for a 
wide variety of applications 
0,676 0,316 0,106 0,008 0,878 0,056 0,007 0,451 0,057 0,562 -0,013 
We use many different 
technologies and technical 
solutions in our products 
0,744 -0,029 0,000 0,227 0,784 
-
0,156 
-
0,085 0,654 0,065 0,168 
-
0,161 
Products must interconnect 
with other products or 
systems to have value for 
customers 
0,818 -0,042 0,022 0,877 
-
0,007 
-
0,026 0,128 0,810 0,070 
-
0,135 
-
0,099 
The operation of our 
products relies on the 
operation of many other 
technical systems 
0,722 0,145 0,163 0,943 0,116 -0,064 
-
0,043 0,833 0,008 0,015 0,163 
Large unit cost reductions 
can be obtained by increasing 
the scale of operations 
0,175 0,754 -0,117 0,052 
-
0,086 0,106 0,690 
-
0,072 
-
0,034 0,742 0,243 
Improving production 
processes brings much higher 
returns than product 
innovations 
0,072 0,775 0,005 0,236 -0,037 
-
0,569 0,284 
-
0,126 0,170 
-
0,001 0,793 
Most of the products of our 
sector face severe cost 
constraints 
0,069 0,734 0,127 -0,011 0,084 
-
0,081 0,813 0,017 
-
0,174 0,080 0,753 
Percent of total variance 
explained by the component 31,3 16,7 12,9 21,4 17,2 16,3 12,4 23,8 16,6 13,8 10,4 
Percent of variance explained 
by these components  60,9 67,2 64,6 
Number of iterations for 
rotation to converge 4 4 5 
Observations 142 63 228 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
           Rotation Method: Quartimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
           
 
 
 
31 
 
 
Table 4.3: Resources and strategic-dynamic growth in the sector 
Questions Id-Ie, 13 statements 
Asian manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing firms 
  Component Component Component 
  1 2 3 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Governments allocate a lot of 
resources to support research and 
innovation 
0,177 0,134 0,838 0,063 -0,172 
-
0,056 0,777 0,157 
-
0,027 0,054 0,809 
Innovative startups have easy access 
to funding (seed money, venture 
capital, IPOs) 
0,241 0,064 0,849 0,690 0,024 -0,061 0,239 0,060 0,035 
-
0,042 0,809 
Total sales of our sector grow very 
fast compared to other sectors 0,244 0,757 0,053 0,902 0,120 
-
0,163 
-
0,065 0,753 
-
0,079 
-
0,205 0,161 
Sales in recently opened niches within 
our sector grow extremely fast 0,311 0,635 0,180 0,766 0,276 0,139 
-
0,165 0,679 0,034 
-
0,166 0,114 
The pace of change in our sector is 
very fast compared to other sectors 0,581 0,587 
-
0,101 0,454 0,641 0,048 0,002 0,819 0,111 0,087 0,014 
Very often new competitors enter the 
sector with innovative products 0,641 0,355 0,073 0,312 0,238 
-
0,049 0,768 0,731 0,218 0,070 
-
0,090 
The technological frontier advances 
very rapidly in our sector 0,612 0,438 0,120 0,668 0,062 0,173 0,339 0,810 0,163 0,143 0,019 
External factors are forcing 
unpredictable transformation in our 
sector 
0,623 0,076 0,029 0,132 0,782 -0,033 
-
0,176 0,095 0,845 0,069 0,134 
The boundaries of our sector are 
undergoing a major redefinition 0,563 0,239 0,265 0,454 0,531 
-
0,052 0,080 0,311 0,809 
-
0,008 
-
0,098 
Our sector is going through significant 
developments that nobody 
anticipated 
0,659 0,206 0,039 0,047 0,848 -0,104 0,126 0,258 0,805 0,043 0,031 
Established competitors constantly 
challenge our posititions 0,850 
-
0,105 
-
0,054 0,091 
-
0,103 0,904 0,074 0,045 
-
0,003 0,866 0,047 
Myriads of actions by our rivals 
continually erode our advantage 0,857 
-
0,127 0,011 0,151 0,023 0,862 
-
0,049 
-
0,095 0,221 0,830 
-
0,018 
Our products are constantly under 
attack from low-cost substitutes 0,726 
-
0,154 0,039 
-
0,311 
-
0,067 0,725 
-
0,129 
-
0,256 0,447 0,318 
-
0,125 
Percent of total variance explained by 
the component 39,7 11,5 9,4 30,0 17,0 12,9 8,3 28,2 17,7 10,6 9,5 
Percent of variance explained by 
these components 60,6 68,2 66,0 
Number of iterations for rotation to 
converge 5 5 5 
Observations 142 63 228 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
         Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser 
Normalization. 
 
         The consensus observed in Table 4.2 does not reappear when respondents were asked to consider 
statements on resource inflows, growth and strategic and competitive dynamics in their sector, as 
shown in Table 4.3. However, at a few points all three categories of firms converge: All firms think 
that government does not allocate many resources to support research and innovation – and that 
the pace of change in their sector is rapid compared to other sectors. Apart from this, the most clear-
cut contrast seems to be between Asian manufacturing firms on the one hand, and Norwegian 
manufacturing firms on the other hand. Table 4.3 indicates that in this, Euro-American firms bear 
closer resemblance to Norwegian manufacturing firms, much more so than to Asian manufacturing 
firms. The scores in Table 4.3 indicate that Asian firms attach much importance to the dynamics of 
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technological development and competition in their sector. This is seen in the number of attributes 
in the profile of Asian firms (component 1) in that they, in contrast to Norwegian manufacturing 
firms and Euro-American firms, think that their products are constantly under attack from low-cost 
substitutes – and that their rivals are continually eroding their competitive advantage and 
challenging their positions. Furthermore, they think that their sector is in the process of significant, 
unanticipated developments, which will force unpredictable transformations upon the sector and 
redefine the boundaries of this. Hence, one may interpret this as an indicator of a high awareness 
and anticipation of competition, and the potential impacts on this on the structure and dynamics of 
their sector. This type of awareness is comparatively weak in Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms. One may even be tempted to interpret this as a higher degree of complacency 
and introvert orientation, somewhat similar to what was observed earlier, in the interpretation of 
the results presented in Table 4.1. 
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5 Value creation capability of the firm 
Following the logic and design of the survey described earlier, in the next section of the MINE survey 
respondents were asked to make an assessment of their firm’s capabilities in terms of innovation. 
The respondents were asked to indicate their assessment of a number of statements on a scale going 
from “not important” at one end, to “extremely important” in the opposite end. The statements are 
shown in the left column in Table 5.1. As shown, these cover a broad range of topics related to skills 
and capabilities that innovation researchers think are important or significant for a firm’s innovation 
capabilities.  
 
The results of the factor analysis of the responses are shown in Table 5.1. These are interesting as 
cognitive maps, i.e. the importance firms attach to various innovation capability factors. As shown in 
Table 5.1, Asian firms, by comparison with the other two categories for firms, appear as more 
coherent in their perception of capabilities needed for innovation. In fact, Table 5.1 suggests that 
Asian firms converge in one dominant view – and one contrasting, minority view. In contrast, 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms are much more pluralistic or diverse in what they 
consider as important innovation capabilities. Whereas Norwegian and Euro-American firms seem to 
put primary emphasis on a few capabilities, Asian emphasize numerous. In the latter, greatest 
emphasis is set on their firms’ capability to anticipate and solve customers’ problems and design 
solutions that enhance the full cycle of customer experience. Simultaneously, they put emphasis on 
quality of products, continuous introduction of novelties and product variety. These and related 
capabilities may be interpreted as Asian firms being customer focused in how they evaluate 
innovation capabilities. Asian firms also put emphasis on transforming academic research into useful 
products.  
 
In contrast, as seen in Table 5.1, Norwegian manufacturing firms, in the dominant component 
(component 1), put emphasize capabilities that may be termed as techno-economic focused, such as 
quality and reliability of products and cost reduction. Euro-American firms, in their dominant 
component (component 1), seem to emphasize what may be termed as product focused, because 
they attach highest importance to low costs of products, continuous introduction of novelties and 
design of solutions aimed at enhancing customer experience. The capability of transforming 
academic research into useful products is viewed as less important in Euro-American firms, and, to 
some extent, also in Norwegian firms.  
 
Interestingly, all three categories of firms share a perception that the capability to obtain regulatory 
approvals for products and acceptance of products as de facto standards is not considered 
important. This unity may be interpreted as a shared, hence common perception in the 
manufacturing sector, which presumably makes this different from other sectors of the economy. In 
telecommunications, ICT-equipment and pharmaceuticals, technical standards and regulatory 
approval are important, crucial, for the competitiveness and profitability of firms. This does not seem 
to be the case for manufacturing firms that participated in the MINE survey. 
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Table 5.1: Value creation capability of the firm 
  
Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing firms 
  Component Component Component 
Questions Part II - 12 statements (not 
important - extremely important) 1 2 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Capability to transform the results of 
academic research into useful products 0,552 0,224 0,449 0,130 
-
0,194 0,435 0,215 0,117 0,083 0,597 
Capability to legitimate products by 
obtaining regulatory approvals 0,455 0,660 0,088 0,188 0,297 0,742 0,018 0,156 
-
0,122 0,813 
Capability to gain acceptance for products 
as de facto standards 0,349 0,788 0,224 0,090 0,772 0,398 0,133 0,678 0,008 0,344 
Capability to spur the creation of 
complementary products around open 
architecture 0,437 0,607 0,061 0,028 0,692 0,389 0,230 0,807 0,025 0,093 
Capability to align with dominant solutions 
in order to avoid disruption for clients 0,601 0,203 0,029 0,259 0,796 
-
0,194 
-
0,164 0,778 0,184 0,021 
Capability to engineer products with 
absolute reliability, safety, and security 0,680 0,068 0,810 0,151 0,250 0,082 
-
0,019 0,090 0,484 0,661 
Capability to continually reduce costs 
(including through supply chain design) 0,674 -0,099 0,864 0,226 0,002 
-
0,082 0,030 0,052 0,755 
-
0,113 
Capability to continually improve the 
quality of products 0,715 -0,005 0,819 
-
0,009 0,081 0,255 0,327 0,022 0,726 0,211 
Capability to anticipate and solve 
customers’ problems in special application 0,768 -0,033 0,201 0,817 0,030 0,280 0,400 0,210 0,469 0,144 
Capability to increase product variety while 
keeping customization costs low 0,714 -0,042 0,050 0,782 0,262 0,069 0,819 0,053 0,225 
-
0,021 
Capability to continually introduce 
novelties (new product releases, and 
functionalities) 0,702 0,039 0,124 0,162 0,091 0,757 0,868 
-
0,042 0,001 0,167 
Capability to design solutions that enhance 
the full cycle of customer experience 
(product choice, tranactions, use, service, 
disposal etc.) 0,701 0,130 0,175 0,851 0,041 0,103 0,542 0,329 0,411 0,089 
Percent of total variance explained by the 
component 42,2 9,9 34,7 14,3 12,1 9,5 30,0 14,1 9,8 9,1 
Percent of variance explained by these 
components 52,1 70,6 63,1 
Number of iterations for rotation to 
converge 3 5 6 
Observations 142 63 228 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
        Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
         
In summing up, one may suggest that Table 5.1 gives support to an interpretation that there are 
regional distinctions in terms of what innovative manufacturing firms consider as important 
capabilities related to their firms’ innovation activities. In this, Asian firms seem to be more 
customers focused and have a greater focus on leveraging academic research. They are also more 
coherent and unified in the capabilities that they consider as important. In contrast, both Norwegian 
and Euro-American firms are more pluralistic and put emphasis on other capabilities compared with 
Asian firms. Hence, Euro-American firms emphasize what was characterized as product focus and 
Norwegian firms have a stronger techno-economic focus related to their innovation. As will be 
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shown, these interpretations are congruent with findings that will be presented later in this report, 
i.e. that Asian firms seem to be more extrovert and research oriented in their innovation strategies 
and practices – in contrast to Norwegian and Euro-American, that are more introvert.  
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6 Innovation awareness in the organization 
This topic, innovation awareness, sets a focus on an aspect of innovation culture and climate in the 
firms that participated in the survey, in the way this is reflected in the responses made by those who 
answered the questionnaire, i.e. people with high management responsibility for innovation in the 
firms, such as CTOs, R&D managers, PD managers, etc. This topic is important because one may 
assume that how innovation awareness is understood and how this manifests itself may be viewed as 
an indicator of the attitude of the firm towards doing innovation activities. It seems fair to assume 
that if a company has little awareness of innovation, then it seems hard to expect that the company 
give high priority to innovation activities. In contrast, if innovation awareness is considered 
important, research would be interested in finding out the implications of this. In the material 
presented earlier, in the responses to other topic in the survey, Asian firms diverge from Norwegian 
and Euro-American firms on many topics. Table 6.1 shows how the firms responded to the 
statements on innovation awareness. As shown, in the dominant component, the factor analysis 
generated highest scores for Asian firms, because this explains the largest percentage of the 
variance. According to this, Asian firms put emphasis on innovation awareness on people in their firm 
who identify: 
- Long term marketing capabilities (highest score) 
- Long term manufacturing capabilities 
- Long term scientific and engineering capabilities 
- People who are responsible for new product development projects in each unit of the firm. 
In Norwegian and Euro-American firms, these aspects were not considered as important.  As seen in 
table 6, there is some congruence between the scores from Norwegian and Asian firms: Both 
categories put emphasis on how their firms interpret information relevant for innovation regarding: 
- The company’s overall strategy 
- All new capabilities the company might need for innovation 
- New product strategies in the business(es) 
Whereas Asian firms were oriented towards people, Norwegian firms put emphasis on formal 
management processes for learning from relevant experiences with innovation activities, in terms of: 
- Learning from past projects and transferring lessons learned to new projects, 
- Learning across different entities in the organization. 
- Processes for assessing and improving capabilities in technology, NPD, marketing, etc. 
These aspects were also emphasized by Asian firms, but the results obtained from the analysis does 
not show as high scores as with the Norwegian firms. In Euro-American firms, in their dominant 
strategy, these statements obtained low scores. Instead, the highest scores obtained on innovation 
awareness topics were those that Asian and Norwegian firms gave low scores, such as: 
- Articulation of specialized knowledge in ways that make sense to other specialities, 
- Understand issues and constraints in other functions, 
- Problem solving capability related to innovation projects by exploring a variety of options, 
- Take responsibility for the entire innovation project. 
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Table 6.1: Innovation awareness in the organization 
Questions IV 1-5, 17 statements Asian firms Norwegian firms Euro-American firms 
  Component Component Component 
Variable 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 
Understand how any new products fit with 
business strategy (few-everyone) 
0,457 0,175 0,679 0,094 0,023 0,286 0,307 0,768 0,185 0,203 0,842 0,232 -0,034 
Understand how technology programs 
contribute to corporate and business goals 
(few-everyone) 
0,358 0,357 0,642 0,120 0,102 0,448 0,275 0,681 0,181 0,173 0,847 0,212 0,055 
Understand priorities are among projects, 
programs and programs (few-everyone) 
0,351 0,424 0,590 0,064 0,306 0,138 0,325 0,744 0,137 0,183 0,607 0,187 0,238 
Interpretation of information regarding the 
company’s overall strategy (rarely-regularly) 
0,726 0,049 0,328 0,089 0,808 0,070 0,110 0,049 0,146 0,202 0,267 0,749 0,175 
Interpretation of information regarding all 
new capabilities the company might need for 
innovation (rarely-regularly) 
0,728 0,006 0,353 0,192 0,853 0,000 -0,099 0,226 0,190 0,159 0,173 0,835 0,185 
Interpretation of information on new product 
strategies in the business(es) (rarely-regularly) 
0,725 -0,077 0,337 0,075 0,780 0,029 0,038 0,273 0,175 0,216 0,246 0,764 0,248 
Identify people who build (not just apply) 
long-term scientific and engineering 
capabilities (few-most) 
0,810 0,360 -0,001 
-
0,039 0,080 0,238 0,852 0,195 0,262 0,774 0,234 0,155 0,025 
Identify people who build (not just apply) 
long-term marketing capabilities (few-most) 
0,867 0,186 -0,106 
-
0,060 0,111 0,161 0,865 0,120 0,232 0,805 0,107 0,177 0,083 
Identify people who build (not just apply) 
long-term manufacturing capabilities (few-
most) 
0,823 0,235 -0,172 0,003 0,230 0,351 0,695 0,149 0,141 0,806 0,056 0,148 0,061 
Identify people responsible for working on 
new product development projects in each 
unit (few-most) 
0,795 0,132 -0,105 0,118 
-
0,189 0,207 0,601 0,463 0,280 0,637 0,440 0,004 0,049 
Articulation of specialized knowledge in ways 
that make sense to other specialities (few-
everyone) 
0,406 0,722 -0,001 0,139 0,148 0,902 0,125 0,163 0,760 0,288 0,022 0,278 0,014 
Understand issues and constraints in other 
functions (few-everyone) 0,301 0,789 0,043 0,199 0,122 0,854 0,307 0,185 0,799 0,266 0,057 0,293 0,073 
Deal with problems that occur in innovation 
projects by by exploring a variety of options 
(few-everyone) 
0,250 0,762 0,168 0,097 0,377 0,623 0,457 0,190 0,757 0,186 0,273 0,089 0,178 
Take responsibility for the entire innovation 
project (few-everyone) 0,299 0,688 0,181 
-
0,101 0,218 0,726 0,209 0,311 0,712 0,162 0,248 
-
0,084 0,206 
Formal management processes for learning 
from past projects and transferring lessons 
learned to new projects (disagree-agree) 
0,558 0,186 0,175 0,644 0,710 0,461 0,067 -0,175 0,129 0,106 0,089 0,081 0,855 
Formal management processes for enabling 
functions to learn from each other (disagree-
agree) 
0,478 0,305 0,071 0,739 0,596 0,563 0,107 -0,283 0,220 0,049 
-
0,040 0,232 0,850 
Formal management processes for assessing 
and improving capabilities in technology, NPD, 
marketing, etc. (disagree-agree) 
0,467 0,125 0,115 0,720 0,744 0,359 0,181 -0,173 0,088 0,052 0,294 0,386 0,701 
Percent of variance explained by the 
component 48,1 9,8 7,4 6,6 43,2 17,6 8,6 6,4 41,1 11,9 8,7 6,7 5,9 
Percent of variance explained by all the 
components 72,0 75,9 74,3 
Number of iterations for rotation to converge 5 8 6 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.           
Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization.          
 
One salient aspect of how firms respond is that Asian firms appear to be more cohesive in their 
dominant strategy, i.e. the Asian firms had a component in the factor analysis that had the highest 
percentage of variance explained.  Similar results were obtained in the factor analyses presented 
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earlier. However, in terms of innovation awareness, one may suggest that the comparatively large 
numbers of components that were generated in the factor analysis may indicate that Asian firms are 
pluralistic in terms of how they view the topic of innovation awareness; this pluralism may also be 
observed in both Norwegian and Euro-American firms. Still, there are differences: Whereas Asian 
firms put more emphasis on both interpretation and identification of issues related to innovation 
awareness, Norwegian firms emphasize interpretation and formal management processes related to 
innovation awareness. In contrast, Euro-American firms had high scores on aspects that may be 
characterized as communicative and action-oriented. All firms have in common that they do not put 
much emphasis on “understanding”.  
 
One interpretation of the results presented in Table 6.1 on innovation awareness is that Asian and 
Norwegian firms are similar in the emphasis they put on many aspects; Euro-American firms deviate 
for this. This may possibly be explained as Euro-American firms being more action-oriented and less 
analytical in their innovation awareness, compared to Asian and Norwegian firms. Asian and 
Norwegian firms may be interpreted as more analytical because of the emphasis they put on 
interpretation in their innovation awareness. However, Norwegian firms align this with formal 
management processes. Although Asian firms also seem to attach some importance to formal 
management processes, this is not the case for Euro-American firms. In contrast to Norwegian firms, 
Asian firms align interpretation with people in the organization, instead of formal management 
processes as in Norwegian firms. One interpretation of this could be that Asian firms, to a greater 
extent than Norwegian and Euro-American firms, emphasize innovation awareness with individual 
employees in the organization. This, if valid, contradicts the assumption that in Asian firms, a 
collectivistic corporate culture is strong, in contrast to Nordic (Norwegian) firms in which 
individualism is considered as a salient aspect of corporate or company culture.  
 
Another interesting result in Table 6.1 is the response of Euro-American firm on innovation 
awareness, which was earlier characterized as action oriented, in the dominant component. The 
implication of this outcome is difficult to interpret, but looking closely, one may notice that the 
highest score was given to the statement “understanding issues and constraints in other functions”.  
Hence, in innovation awareness, these firms attach importance to having a broad view of matters 
related to innovation, and, perhaps, the importance of interdependencies between functions. The 
scores on other statements suggest that they consider innovation awareness as something general 
and do not connect this to individuals or organizational entities within the firm. Hence, one may 
suggest that Euro-American firms have a weaker, perhaps more diffuse and general sense of what 
innovation awareness implies, compared to Asian and Norwegian firms. These firms (Asian and 
Norwegian) have more specific and operationalized view because they both emphasize the 
importance of interpretation, i.e. the analytical aspect of innovation awareness. However, they 
differ, as pointed out earlier, in how this is operationalized. 
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7 Innovation strategy processes and decision 
making 
The topic of this section belongs to what some innovation studies suggest is a “black box”, because 
there is little knowledge on innovation strategy processes and related decision making. One reason 
for this is the difficulty of doing research on these topics, i.e. collecting data on these processes and 
decisions. Few researchers have been admitted to the arenas where such decisions are made, e.g. in 
order to do observations. Furthermore, this is a subject matter that is often ephemeral, transient and 
open for wide ex-post interpretations, as aptly pointed out by the research done by Van de Ven et al. 
(1999). In spite of these methodological difficulties, it should be possible to get some idea of what 
actors who participate in the innovation strategy process and decision making think and believe are 
important aspects, people and positions. For this purpose, the respondents in the MINE-survey were 
asked to express their opinion on 18 statements related to innovation strategy processes and 
decision making in the firm, indicating their opinion on each statement on a seven point scale from 
disagree to agree. These answers were analyzed by factor analysis, as described earlier, and the 
results obtained are shown in Table 7.116. 
 
At first glance, Table 7.1 once more indicates that there are differences between the three categories 
of firms, specifically by comparing component 1 of the factor analysis. First of all, component 1 of 
Asian firms has a much higher percentage of variance explained, compared to the two other 
categories of firms. In Norwegian firms, component 1 obtained the lowest percentage (19,7%) of 
variance explained and the factor analysis generated seven components; both figures indicate a high 
degree of heterogeneity and pluralism. This could indicate that Norwegian firms are not much unified 
in their perception of innovation strategy processes and decision making. In comparison, Asian firms 
seem more coherent, although pluralism also exists among these. Euro-American firms may be seen 
as having a position in-between Asian firms on one side, and Norwegian firms on the other, however, 
in this axis, they tend to be more similar to Asian firms than Norwegian. 
 
Looking more closely at what differentiates the three categories of firms, one striking aspect is that 
Asian firms seem to put high priority on the role of New Product Development teams (NPD-teams) in 
vital functions related to innovation strategy processes and decision making. In addition, Asian firms 
emphasize the importance of people within the firm who have marketing capabilities, and also 
people with scientific and engineering capability, for innovation strategy processes and decision 
making. In Norwegian firms, Business Unit (BU) managers have the main decision making authority 
and power because this includes responsibility (and control) of NPD portfolio management, 
leadership role vis a vis R&D units – and implementation of innovation strategies.  Euro-American 
firms bear some resemblance with Asian firms because they also put much emphasis on NPD-teams, 
however, but they do not put much importance on including people with marketing capabilities and 
                                                          
16  Table 7.1 is simplified because only two components from each category of firms are shown, these two 
being the ones that have the largest percentage of variance explained. The number of components that 
were generated in the factor analysis and the total percentage of variance explained by these, is shown at 
the bottom of Table 7.1 
 40 
people with scientific and engineering capabilities in innovation strategy processes and decision 
making, as Asian firms do in their dominant strategy (component 1). Nor do the Euro-American firms 
empower NPD-teams to make decisions on product concepts, which may explain why they do not 
bestow the NPD-team with the power to command the entire NPD-process to the same extent as 
Asian firms.  
 
Table 7.1: Innovation strategy processes and decision making 
Questions IV 6, 18 statements 
Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing 
firms 
  Component Component Component 
Variable 1 2 1 2 1 2 
New directions for the firm are on the agenda of every top management team 
meeting (disagree-agree) 0,304 0,037 0,168 0,018 0,079 0,762 
Senior managers often disagre over the best strategic direction(s) for the 
company (disagree-agree) 0,196 0,105 -0,002 0,100 -0,111 0,152 
Senior managers are formally assigned to improve processes that support 
innovation (disagree-agree) 0,344 0,086 0,684 0,240 0,186 0,721 
Senior managers discuss strategic directions with employees at least monthly 
(disagree-agree) 0,335 0,061 0,126 -0,080 0,179 0,774 
Employees regularly challenge senior managers’ understanding of our firm's 
situation (disagree-agree) 0,280 0,175 -0,059 0,250 0,131 0,658 
We come up with new capabilities before we know how they will be used for 
products (disagree-agree) 0,134 0,327 0,344 0,000 0,023 -0,045 
People who build marketing capabilities decide which ones to develop, within 
strategic guidelines (disagree-agree) 0,608 -0,017 -0,014 0,633 0,384 0,088 
People who build scientific and engineering capabilities decide which ones to 
develop, within strategic guidelines (disagree-agree) 0,511 0,065 0,033 0,089 -0,068 0,208 
People who build manufacturing capabilities decide which ones to develop, 
within strategic guidelines (disagree-agree) 0,463 0,031 -0,039 -0,230 0,195 0,019 
All business unit (BU) managers regularly update their portfolios with new 
products (disagree-agree) 0,345 0,798 0,741 0,107 0,084 0,332 
BU managers keep R&D informed about new functionalities needed in products 
(disagree-agree) 0,458 0,681 0,542 -0,061 0,419 0,385 
BU managers are free to decide how to implement their innovation strategies 
(disagree-agree) 0,337 0,624 0,808 0,025 0,077 -0,042 
NPD teams decide how to define their product concept, within strategic 
guidelines (disagree-agree) 0,747 0,129 0,428 0,491 0,345 0,100 
The same team controls the entire NPD process from definition to 
commercialization (disagree-agree) 0,730 -0,141 -0,084 0,083 0,509 -0,088 
NPD teams can pull in corporate or business resources (R&D, marketing) as 
needed (disagree-agree) 0,775 -0,085 0,018 0,645 0,790 0,033 
R&D managers ensure that their people participate effectively on NPD teams 
(disagree-agree) 0,746 0,235 0,185 0,850 0,749 0,222 
Marketing managers ensure that their people participate effectively on NPD 
teams (disagree-agree) 0,780 0,193 0,059 0,573 0,851 0,162 
Manufacturing managers ensure that their people participate effectively on NPD 
teams (disagree-agree) 0,810 0,118 -0,253 0,213 0,697 0,364 
Percent of total variance explained by the component 39,2 8,3 19,7 13,6 28,6 10,1 
Number of interations for rotation to converge 6 9 5 
Number of components generated 5 7 5 
Percent of variance explained by these components 66,8 75,8 62,0 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
      Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
       
Another interesting observation that may be made of the results in Table 7.1 is that all three 
categories of firms are similar in their view of some aspects related to innovation strategy processes 
and decision making: 
- Innovation is not an important item on the agenda of top management meetings in the firms, 
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- Whether or not senior managers disagree over the best innovation strategy is not considered 
important, 
- Senior managers do not discuss strategic directions with their employees frequently,  and, 
reciprocally, employees rarely challenge senior managers’ understanding of their firm’s 
situation, 
- Firms do not create new innovation capabilities without plans or strategies, nor do people 
related to manufacturing have authority to decide NPD. 
By looking at what the three categories of firms emphasize and what they have in common in terms 
of low scores in Table 7.1, the following interpretations seem plausible: 
- Top management and senior managers do not consider innovation an important issue. 
Innovation does not occupy a high position in their agendas, nor is this an important issue 
among employees. 
- NPD is not a haphazard activity among employees, nor do people who are related to 
manufacturing functions of the firm influence decisions on NPD. At the “grass root” level of 
the firm, NPD and related innovation activities do not seem to play an important role. 
- The material, as shown in Table 7.1, suggests heterogeneity among firms as to how 
innovation strategy processes and decision making is done.  
- However, by comparison, Asian firms exhibit a larger degree of cohesion compared to the 
others, because its component 1 has the highest percentage of variance explained, 
compared to the other categories of firms. 
-  Asian firms seem to put much emphasis on NPD-teams in innovation processes, NPD-teams 
are given much power and autonomy in Asian firms. 
- To a less extent, the same observation may be made in Euro-American firms. 
- In contrast, Norwegian firms seem to emphasize BUs’ role and power in NPD; Norwegian BUs 
also instruct the R&D function as to NPD, i.e. the BUs are supreme. 
- However, in the heterogeneity of the responses reflected by the high number of components 
generated by the factor analysis as shown in table 6, one may find components with high 
degree of similarity, but these are usually weak, i.e. the percentage of variance that these 
explain is low.  
The implication of the results presented in Table 7.1 and explored above seem to be that 
heterogeneity is a salient aspect in terms on innovation strategy processes and decision making in 
innovative manufacturing firms. Hence, firms have a multitude of innovation strategy processes and 
modes of decision making related to this, as evident in the high number of components generated by 
the factor analysis that resulted in Table 7.1. By comparing the components that had the highest 
percentage of variance explained (component 1), some aspects seem to be distinct: 
- Asian firms give NPD-teams a high degree of autonomy and power over innovation strategy 
processes and decision making – and this is also associated with alignment of people who 
build marketing capabilities and scientific and engineering capabilities in the firms. 
- Euro-American firms are to some extent similar to Asian and they do not have the alignment 
that Asian firms have made with people who build capabilities in terms of marketing and 
scientific and engineering capabilities. 
- Norwegian firms, in contrast, rely on BUs for innovation strategy processes and decision 
making – and align this with senior managers in the organization who are formally assigned 
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to support innovation processes. Although this pattern is seen in the “strongest” component 
(component 1), the second strongest component (component 2) has some similarity with the 
one observed as component 1 in Euro-American firms, which points to the aspect of 
heterogeneity. 
These aspects may be interpreted as differences in terms of dominant innovation strategy 
“philosophies” or cultures. The implication of the Asian dominant pattern is that firms prioritize 
dedicated, professional organizational entities within their organization, i.e. they empower the NPD-
teams and extraordinary people (individuals with a keen interest in innovation) in their organization. 
A dominant belief in Norwegian firms, in contrast, is that innovation strategy processes and decision 
making should be made by the BUs. The “philosophy” or corporate culture in firms that make this 
type of priority is that responsibility for NPD should be taken by BUs because they are the ones that 
also should carry the costs of doing NPD – and they are the ones who are experts on what type and 
how much NPD should be done, i.e. the BUs will make NPD most cost efficient. Innovation studies 
suggest that the organization of NPD reflects the size and technological diversity of a firm (Tirpak, et 
al., 2006): In a “normal” growth pattern, as firms grow in size and outreach, they tend to become 
more divisionalized and organized into comparatively autonomous BUs that are given a high degree 
of responsibility for functions, such as R&D and NPD. However, as firms become really large and 
multinational, they tend to reintroduce separate, autonomous R&D and NPD entities funded by the 
corporate HQ because corporate management want to increase the innovativeness of their firm: 
Divisionalizing a firm often means downsizing R&D and NPD for reasons of cost – which in the long 
run may cause the firm to become obsolete. 
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8 Strategies and practices for innovation 
8.1 Exploration activities 
The main idea of the questions asked on this topic was to get a picture of what kind of practices 
decision-makers in innovative manufacturing firms pursue in order to explore opportunities for 
innovation and search for new ideas. Although termed “practice”, this is just as much about “policy” 
and “strategy”, i.e. what set of rules firms attempt to follow – and what type of goals they attempt to 
attain when they work with new ideas that may potentially be developed to become innovations. 
Increasingly, both innovation research and innovation managers suggest that this topic has become 
crucially important, perhaps one of the most critical and strategic part of doing innovation. Being 
able to select the “right” idea for innovation development is seen as the most important success 
criteria for firms: No matter how excellent or perfect a product or service development is, a poor 
idea will just become a poor new product or service; however, a good idea may survive in spite of a 
poor product or service development. The notion of “Fuzzy Front End” of innovation (Robert G 
Cooper, et al., 2000; Gordon, et al., 2008; Koen, et al., 2001) has gained increasing interest among 
innovation strategy managers, reflecting the emphasis that is put on this.  
 
One of the most penetrating and comprehensive studies of innovation processes, the Minnesota 
Innovation Research Program, under the leadership of Andrew H. Van de Ven  (Ven, et al., 1999), 
suggest that innovation processes, more often than not, are set in motion when firms experience 
what they perceive  as “shocks”. This may be caused by an external source, such as a sudden loss of 
market shares and drop in sales, or, internal sources, such as a sudden shift in the firm’s strategy 
subsequent to the entry of a new management or a merger or acquisition by another firm. This will 
initiate a search or exploration for ideas for product or service development, i.e. the activities that 
constitute the fuzzy front-end of innovation. This initiation phase is characterized by Ven et al (1999) 
as a “gestation period”, which, analogous to a pregnancy, means the period from conception to the 
birth on an idea – or what other researchers call the fuzzy front-end of innovation.  
 
According to Luoma, Paasi and Nordlund  (2008), fuzzy front-end of innovation is important for the 
entire innovation process “...because it is at this stage that crucial decisions regarding the target 
markets and customers, strategic alignment and resources are made”  (p.2). Although only 10% of 
the cost of product or service development is spent at this stage, Luoma, Paasi and Nordlund suggest 
that 70% of the total costs of a product development project are committed at his stage, however, 
the bulk of these costs are spent at the subsequent commercialization phase, which in terms of 
resources, is the most demanding. Hence, they suggest, there is a strong link between the fuzzy 
front-end of innovation and commercialization. These views are supported by Brem and Voigt (2009), 
who elaborate this by suggesting that the fuzzy front-end of innovation “...is one of the greatest 
areas of weakness of the innovation process and fundamentally determines the later innovation 
success” (p. 353). Poskela and Martinsou (2009) also support this view by stating that the fuzzy front-
end of innovation “...is regarded as the most troublesome phase of the innovation process and at the 
same time as one of the greatest opportunities to improve the overall innovation capability of a 
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company” (p. 671).  They characterize this as complex in terms of management, and suggest that 
innovation performance of a firm is determined by what kind of decisions and interventions that 
managers make at this early stage in the innovation process. Alam (2006) reinforces this viewpoint by 
summarizing research showing that “...a firm can benefit substantially by optimizing and improving 
the fuzzy front-end of an innovation process” (p. 468). This should be done with an emphasis on 
customer interaction, because this stage is what they characterize as the “most information 
intensive” in terms of planning and strategy related to product and service development. A similar 
understanding is expressed Bröring, Cloutier and Leker (2006). Some researchers (Backman, 
Borjesson, & Setterberg, 2007) suggest that the fuzzy front-end of innovation is particularly 
important for new product development aimed at creating radical innovations, however, this view is 
not supported by other research (Verworn, 2009; Verworn, Herstatt, & Nagahira, 2008). Still, 
research seems to be unanimous in considering that the fuzzy front-end of innovation is significant 
for the innovation process itself – and for the subsequent commercialization of a new product or 
service. 
 
In the MINE survey, informants were asked to give their opinion on eight statements regarding 
exploration activities related to innovation management, i.e. what kind of practices and strategies 
they follow. For this purpose they were asked to indicate on a seven point scale, from “Totally 
disagree” (1) to “Totally agree” (7), with “Neutral” (4) in the middle. 
 
Table 8.1: Factor analysis of exploration activities 
  Asian firms Norwegian firms 
Euro-American 
firms 
Variable 
Component Component Component 
1 2 1 2 3 1 2 
Long-term internal programs for 
new technologies 
.510 .555 .733 .250 .152 .660 .274 
In-house capability for market 
trends detection 
.058 .731 .678 -.463 .338 .522 -.493 
Encourage cross-fertilization of 
ideas by staff mobility 
.381 .663 .722 .087 -.574 .737 .116 
Time and resources given to 
employees 
.475 .684 .844 .258 -.131 .691 .075 
Interaction with key suppliers and 
customers 
.570 .063 .492 -.100 .124 .521 .349 
Participation in industry networks .809 .174 .315 .124 .802 .302 .566 
Co-opt external experts for future 
prospects 
.825 .016 .014 .862 -.073 .214 .785 
Cooperation with university spin-
offs 
.821 .179 .279 .704 .273 .167 .714 
Percent of variance explained 46,9 12,8 37 17,6 13,4 34,3 16,5 
Number of iterations for rotation 
to converge 3 5 3 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
     Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
     
As shown in Table 8.1, the pattern of correlations between the eight initial variables and the two 
components with the highest (component 1) and the second highest (component 2) per cent of total 
variance explained for Asian manufacturing firms is to a large extent the reverse compared to the 
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similar pattern for Euro-American manufacturing firms. Norwegian manufacturing firms seem to 
resemble Euro-American manufacturing firms. In these two categories of firms (Norwegian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms), the dominant practice corresponds to a large extent to the less 
dominant Asian practice. However, this contrast is not absolute: In terms of the variable “Long-term 
internal programs for new technologies” and “Interaction with key suppliers and customers” there is 
some communality in all the three categories of firms.  
 
The overall results shown in Table 8.1 indicate that in terms of dominant practices related to 
exploration activities, the practices of Asian manufacturing firms are distinct in so far as they 
emphasize combinations of the following variables: 
- Long-term internal programs for new technologies 
- Interaction with key suppliers and customers 
- Participation in industry networks 
- Co-opt external experts for future prospects 
- Cooperation with university spin-offs 
Compared to the dominant practices of Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, one may 
suggest that Asian manufacturing firms are more extrovert and oriented towards cooperation with 
external actors, such as industry networks, external experts and university spin-offs. Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms, in contrast, have dominant practices embedded in their 
innovation strategy  that may be characterized as more introvert, compared to its Asian 
counterparts. This is evident because what emerged as the dominant practice in these firms was a 
greater emphasis given to the following variables: 
- In-house capability for market trends detection17 
- Encourage cross-fertilization of ideas by staff mobility 
- Time and resources given to employees 
This may be interpreted as an indication that Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms 
give higher priority to leveraging the talents and resources of their own employees and internal 
activities in the firms in terms of exploration activities, i.e. that their dominant practice and strategy 
is to be more self-reliant, compared with Asian manufacturing firms. Hence, characterizing this as 
introvert seems apt. 
 
8.2 Decision-making and portfolio management 
This topic deals with how innovative manufacturing firms choose and give priority to various 
innovation projects, i.e. what kind of guidelines or rules they apply for making these types of 
decisions. At some point, firms will have to decide on matters relevant for initiating innovation 
activities. Of course, an important aspect in this will be the outcomes of the exploration activities 
analyzed in the previous section. A tangible and convenient approach to this question is to start with 
an organizational perspective, based on the assumption that decisions on innovation activities may 
                                                          
17  This was only moderately distinct in the Euro-American firms. 
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be considered as a type of investment, i.e. a type of commitment of resources and associated 
strategic choice (Godø, 2009). Similar to other types of investments decisions, these may be 
characterized by a dichotomy: 
- Formal decisions, i.e. some type of approval (or rejection, which is also a decision) of a plan by a 
person with authority to make this type of decision, or, more common, some types of collective 
decision making units, such as a board or a committee or a group of managers and executives, 
etc. These types of decisions are typically for approving a plan and budget for a project, or more 
permanent, an annual budget for some organizational entity that is responsible for some types of 
innovation activities, such as a permanent R&D facility or product development unit. 
 
- Informal decisions, sometimes even experienced as a “non-decision”, in the sense that 
innovation activities are initiated without formal approval from any governing body or person in 
the firm. However, more often than not, because those initiating the activities have a sense of 
“understanding”, some type of tacit approval or climate that favours these types of initiatives 
may exist. Extreme cases of informal decisions are those that initiate innovation activities in 
secret, often after a formal rejection of a project proposal or because those who initiate these 
types of activities anticipate that the formal mechanism for obtaining approval will end up in a 
rejection. 
 
Of course, many in-between categories exist in the continuum between the formal-informal 
extremes. One common development path in innovation activities is that these are initiated in small 
scale as the result of an informal decision, e.g. exploration of some “bright idea”, or what Van de Ven 
would call a “gestation period” (1999). Then, at some point, a more formal plan is made and 
submitted “upwards” in the system for approval, i.e. a transformation into a formal decision making 
process. The informal process prior to this type of formalization is sometimes called the “Fuzzy Front-
End” of innovation process (Gordon et al., 2008; Koen, et al., 2001) because it is often explorative, in 
the sense that activities at this stage are characterized by search and feasibility analyses. 
 
In the survey, respondents were asked to give their views on nine statements covering a broad range 
of this topic: they were asked to indicate on a seven point scale, from “Totally disagree” (1) to 
“Totally agree” (7), with “Neutral” (4) in the middle. The submitted responses were analyzed using a 
factor analysis (principal component analysis) procedure identical to the one used in the analysis of 
exploration activities in the previous section, i.e. one separate analysis for each of the three 
categories of firms: Asian, Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. The results of these 
three separate analyses were put together, as shown in Table 8.2. 
 
The results shown in Table 8.2 are not as clear-cut in terms of a contrast between Asian 
manufacturing firms on the one side, and Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms on the 
other, as observed in Table 8.1. In fact, there are numerous aspects that are shared by all three 
categories of firms, indicating some degree of commonality in terms of decision-making and portfolio 
management practices and strategies among all the manufacturing firms that participated in the 
MINE survey. All the three categories of firms seem to have in common high priority related to 
practices and strategies that cover the following variables: 
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- Portfolio balanced with projects in different stages 
- Selection committees at different levels choose projects 
- Only a few projects are selected from many ideas 
- Projects are restructured in a strategic perspective 
This commonality may be interpreted as shared sector specific strategies and practices for 
manufacturing industries – something that all manufacturing firms seem to put emphasis on. 
However, in other aspects, the strategies and practices seem to diverge to an extent that may seem 
confusing.  In Table 8.2, one may observe that there is a high positive correlation between each of 
the three last initial variables and the component with the highest per cent of total variance 
explained (component 1) for Asian manufacturing firms, while there is a high positive correlation 
between each of these three variables and successive components which explain progressively 
smaller portions of the total variance for Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. This 
indicates that, whereas Asian manufacturing firms in their dominant practice seem to give high 
priority to a strategy that empower middle managers to reallocate funding for projects and that also 
evaluate projects in a portfolio perspective and select these according to technology and product 
roadmap, in Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, these strategies and practices seem 
more pluralistic. This variety in strategies and practices could also be interpreted as Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms being less coherent in terms of their strategies and practices 
when they make decisions on portfolio and innovation activities. 
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Table 8.2:  Factor analysis of decision-making and portfolio management related to 
innovation 
  Asian firms Norwegian firms Euro-American firms 
Variable 
Component Component Component 
1 2 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Portfolio balanced with projects 
in different stages  
.862 -.125 .734 .500 -.265 -.053 .847 .047 .146 .102 
Selection committees at 
different levels choose projects 
.825 -.041 .829 .188 .103 .082 .846 -.182 .131 .101 
Only a few projects are 
selected from many ideas  
.766 .121 .808 -.141 .073 .078 .790 .276 .004 -.045 
Projects are restructured in a 
strategic perspective  
.679 .412 .826 -.190 .105 -.002 .501 .644 -.004 .226 
Policy of focusing funding on a 
few projects with high risks  
.228 .852 .154 .011 -.093 .948 .005 .866 .152 -.032 
Many unofficial projects are 
supported  
.424 .722 .469 .205 .533 .440 .122 .377 .678 .052 
Middle managers empowered 
to reallocate funding for 
projects 
.622 .406 .144 .001 .934 -.137 .187 -.060 .857 .003 
Projects are evaluated in a 
portfolio perspective 
.756 .225 .398 .776 -.037 -.016 .307 .137 .323 .688 
Projects are selected according 
to technology and product 
roadmap  
.539 -.089 -.257 .850 .122 .061 .037 -.016 -.120 .896 
Percent of variance explained 48,9 13,6 37 17,6 13,4 11,6 34,7 14,5 12,9 11,4 
Number of iterations for 
rotation to converge 3 5 4 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
        Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
        
In comparing what may be interpreted as more “weakly dominant” practices as seen in components 
2, 3 and 4 in Table 8.2 for Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, the variables with high 
scores are placed in different components for these two categories of firms, giving support to the 
interpretation of diversity of strategies and practices. However, there is one interesting similarity 
between the Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms in terms of component 3 (the 
component with the third highest per cent of total variance explained), which also has some 
commonality with Asian manufacturing firms in their component 2 (the component with the second 
highest per cent of total variance explained). This may be interpreted as a type of practice and 
strategy, although not so dominant, that gives authority and autonomy to middle managers, while 
simultaneously supporting many “unofficial projects”. 
 
In summing up, the Asian manufacturing firms appear to have a more cohesive approach in terms of 
strategies and practices for making decisions related to portfolio management, as seen in component 
1 (the component with the highest per cent of total variance explained) in Table8.2, i.e. the dominant 
practice and strategy of Asian manufacturing firms. However, some aspects of this is shared with 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, and, as shown in Table 8.2, these aspects also 
constitute elements in the dominant strategy and practice of Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms. Hence, there are some aspects that seem “universal”, as suggested earlier. 
However, in general, the Norwegian and Euro-American practices may be characterized as pluralistic 
because diversity seems to exist in terms of portfolio management and related priorities and decision 
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making. For this reason, one may be tempted to interpret this as Asian manufacturing firms adhering 
to one predominant “best practice”, however, among Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing 
firms, there is greater variety in strategies and practices. A natural extension of this interpretation is 
to ask if this apparent cohesiveness of Asian manufacturing firms has contributed to their success. 
Although answering this question seems challenging, raising the question seems reasonable. The 
next section on policies and practices relevant for innovation projects will provide interesting 
information, but does not, unfortunately contribute to providing answers to the question raised 
above. 
 
8.3 Policies and practices relevant for innovation projects 
Once firms have made the crucial decisions on what kind of innovation projects or activities to 
support – and how to support and manage these processes and decisions – the next step is of course 
how to manage the projects or activities. The topics that are relevant in this phase are more on a 
strategic level, related to how leaders and managers view the innovation process; the basic nuts and 
bolts of project management are not so interesting in this context because they are more mundane 
and general, i.e. these issues are shared with other types of project work and not necessarily unique 
for innovation activities. In the MINE survey, informants were asked to give their opinion on eighteen 
statements regarding innovation projects, i.e. what kind of practices and strategies they follow. For 
this purpose they were asked to indicate on a seven point scale, from “Totally disagree” (1) to 
“Totally agree” (7), with “Neutral” (4) in the middle. Table 8.3 shows the eighteen statements that 
respondents were asked to consider and respond by giving indication of their opinion. The mean 
score to most of the statements were around 5, i.e. leaning slightly towards “Totally agree”; only two 
statements obtained means scores below 4, i.e. slightly away from “Neutral” towards the “Disagree”-
end of the scale. This may indicate that respondents did not have strong feelings about the 
statements that were presented in the questionnaire; however, the variation in the responses does 
not indicate nonchalance, i.e. that the respondents just pressed the button in the middle of the 
questionnaire because of convenience. The submitted responses were analyzed using a factor 
analysis (principal component analysis) procedure identical to the one used in the analysis of 
exploration activities and the one used in the analysis of decision-making and portfolio management 
in the previous sections, i.e. one separate analysis for each of the three categories of firms. The 
results of these three separate analyses were put together, as shown in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.3: Factor analysis of policies and practices relevant for innovation projects 
  Asian firms Norwegian firms Non-Asian & non-Norwegian firms 
Questions in the survey (6.3) 
Component Component Component 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 
Our innovations are combinations of ideas resulting from our 
previous projects  .241 .085 .757 -.095 .149 .028 -.041 .806 .204 .020 .084 .588 .156 -.220 .209 
In the beginning, we carefully map the technical and market 
environment of a project .462 .002 .560 .209 .836 .010 .181 .007 .225 .001 .172 .147 .844 .032 .014 
Our concepts are based on extensive prior classification and 
prioritizing of user needs .183 .359 .629 .088 .824 -.169 .064 .188 -.066 -.146 .247 .207 .720 .194 .030 
For every innovation project, we produce a lot of new 
knowledge .331 .462 .330 .054 .337 .256 -.106 .565 -.321 .100 .272 .469 .459 .205 -.016 
We don’t reinvent the wheel, we use available data, 
exemplars, models, and methods .064 .352 .587 .090 .220 .043 .140 .689 .095 .152 -.042 .304 .244 .270 .674 
We assemble our products from the latest modules and parts 
available on the market .072 .607 .257 .085 .733 .060 .032 .239 -.004 .314 .412 .358 -.118 .024 .533 
We often take advantage of knowledge we produced 
originally for a different purpose .064 .513 .266 .625 .242 .077 .326 .123 .608 .107 .053 .749 .114 .110 -.003 
We extensively reuse platforms and modules that our 
company has developed before .147 .291 .481 .449 .101 .009 .855 .142 .090 -.015 .371 .607 .019 .115 .125 
A module that we discard in one project is often useful in 
subsequent projects .218 .671 .137 .115 .172 .133 .799 -.184 .207 .047 .092 .765 .044 .101 -.019 
Very early, we integrate representatives of our key customers 
in the development team .135 .792 -.002 .039 -.150 .223 .556 -.010 -.339 .568 .188 .194 .151 .782 .084 
We try to benefit extensively from suppliers’ experience in 
our innovation projects .321 .737 .087 -.301 .079 -.019 -.019 .353 .174 .818 .326 .095 .386 .565 .281 
We develop and test several concepts in parallel before 
selecting a product concept .550 .477 -.105 .351 -.414 .759 .112 -.199 -.020 .122 .442 .146 .370 .418 -.427 
We do a lot of partial experimentation to obtain data we use 
for building a prototype .790 .250 -.003 .202 .123 .807 -.017 .297 .205 .118 .719 .167 .181 -.082 -.354 
We simulate extensively the behavior of our product before 
building a full prototype .836 .016 .096 .177 .091 .660 .580 .106 .127 -.275 .773 -.076 .068 .195 .054 
We strive to develop a detailed causal model of the 
functioning of our products .803 .139 .190 .071 .119 .663 .451 .136 -.003 -.449 .726 -.007 .330 -.080 .284 
We focus on building up rich experience with the concrete 
functioning of the product .749 .172 .228 -.216 .604 .300 .088 .230 .384 -.180 .632 .187 .342 -.220 .239 
We go through several iterations that completely redefine 
the concept and architecture .721 .201 .090 -.077 .120 .208 .062 .104 .855 .045 .733 .407 .045 .047 -.103 
As early as we can, we ask key customers to test the 
prototype and give us feedback .315 .049 .103 .673 .426 .524 -.080 -.044 .230 .412 .617 .111 -.168 .283 -.059 
Percent of variance explained 36,3 10,7 7,7 6,5 27 16 10,3 8,4 7,4 5,6 32,7 10,4 8,2 6,4 6,2 
Number of iterations for rotation to converge 5 19 5 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
           Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Table 8.3 suggests that Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms have some commonality, in 
contrast to Norwegian manufacturing firms, which diverge from these two categories of firms. 
This may seem surprising, because the results of the two analyses presented earlier (Table 8.1 and 
Table 8.2) suggested a divide with Asian manufacturing firms on the one side and Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms on the other. What emerges as dominant, in terms of 
strategies and practices in both Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, is a factor 
(component 1) which puts emphasis on the following elements: 
- We develop and test several concepts in parallel before selecting a product concept 
- We do a lot of partial experimentation to obtain data we use for building a prototype 
- We simulate extensively the behavior of our product before building a full prototype 
- We strive to develop a detailed causal model of the functioning of our products 
- We focus on building up rich experience with the concrete functioning of the product 
- We go through several iterations that completely redefine the concept and architecture, 
 
In contrast, the Norwegian manufacturing firms, in their dominant strategy and practices 
(component 1), seem to put less emphasis on the elements listed above, although they also 
emphasize focus on building up rich experience with the concrete functioning of the product. 
Instead, their dominant strategies and practices are based on an emphasis of the following 
elements: 
- In the beginning, we carefully map the technical and market environment of a project 
- Our concepts are based on extensive prior classification and prioritizing of user needs 
- We assemble our products from the latest modules and parts available on the market 
Although these practices may be designated as dominant, this is weak compared to the dominant 
strategies and practices of Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. The impression that 
Table 8.3 presents for Norwegian manufacturing firms is indeed pluralism of strategies and 
practices, or alternatively, what may also be interpreted as fragmentation. Of the many strategies 
and practices in Norwegian manufacturing firms, the component 2, which is not dominant, has 
some resemblance with what was characterized as the dominant strategy and practice of Asian 
and Euro-American manufacturing firms. 
 
In general, the plurality of strategies and practices that may be observed in Table 8.3 is highest 
with Norwegian manufacturing firms, followed by Euro-American and finally, Asian manufacturing 
firms. Needless to say, the result shown in table 8.3 could be a statistical artifact, but then this 
cannot explain why there is less variety of strategies and practices among Asian manufacturing 
firms compared to the two other categories of firms. This aspect again is congruent with the 
interpretation made earlier, that Asian manufacturing firms have a greater degree of cohesion in 
terms of strategies and practices that they use – in contrast to Norwegian manufacturing firms. As 
an extension of this, a natural question is to ask if this variety of strategies and practices reflect 
the phenomenon of “games of innovation”, i.e. Norwegian manufacturing firms participate in 
many different games of innovation, hence they will also adopt a greater variety of strategies and 
practices. This explanation does not seem plausible because if this was the case, this variety 
should also be reflected by a variety of strategies and practices in exploration activities and in 
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portfolio management and related decision-making, and, as soon will become evident, also in 
commercialization activities, but this is not the case. Furthermore, if this assumption was valid, 
then Asian and Euro-American firms would show up as having more pluralistic practices, similar to 
Norwegian firms. 
 
8.4 Commercialization practices 
The firms were asked to respond to ten statements related to their practices on 
commercialization of new products and services, i.e. how they think and work with making new 
products and services into innovations. In the survey, the respondents were asked to indicate on a 
seven point scale their views on statements, from “Totally agree” (1) to “Totally disagree” (7) in 
the other extreme, with the category “Neutral” (4) in the middle.  
 
Table 8.4: Factor analysis of commercialization practices 
  Asian firms Norwegian firms 
Euro-
American 
firms 
Variable 
Component Component Component 
1 2 1 2 3 4 1 2 
Strategic framework for 
commercialization: .564 .536 .797 .035 -.146 -.082 .558 .445 
Corporate entrepreneurship 
facilitate creation of new 
businesses 
.234 .759 -.020 .059 .928 -.032 .190 .753 
Champions are nurtured to 
facilitate transfer of innovations 
to business units 
.408 .629 .634 -.327 .390 -.053 .641 .126 
Innovation projects occasionally 
used for transforming the 
corporation 
.190 .785 .077 .064 .028 .874 .701 -.273 
Special corporate teams & 
funding to support new market 
entry 
.555 .532 .736 .084 .036 .350 .778 -.059 
Incentives to induce managers to 
develop innovative businesses .831 .116 .314 .467 .561 .301 .426 .650 
R&D finds best way of 
commercialization  .799 .136 .348 .732 .391 .167 .804 .020 
New venture group specialized 
in developing new internal 
business 
.816 .184 .719 .460 .071 -.033 .776 -.017 
Businesses are expected to 
generate a % of revenues from 
new products 
.860 .138 -.073 .817 -.095 -.221 .634 .314 
Policy of encouraging spinouts 
led by our personnel .817 -.045 .076 .700 .037 .477 .572 .370 
Percent of variance explained 51,8 13,5 34,1 16,7 12,4 10,5 43,2 12,1 
Number of iterations for rotation 
to converge 3 7 3 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
      Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
      
The mean score for all the ten statements that they responded to was 3.7, which gives an 
indication that the “center of gravity” was “neutral”, with a slight dominance towards 
disagreement, however, the mean scores for the individual statements ranged from 4.45 to 2.76. 
This indicates that respondents gave answers based on their judgments of the questions. The 
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lowest score, i.e. the statement that respondents disagreed most with was “R&D has to find the 
best way to commercialize innovations internally and externally”. On the opposite end, the 
statement “Businesses are expected to generate a percentage of revenues from new products” 
obtained the highest mean score, i.e. closest to the “Totally agree” end of the scale. The 
submitted responses were analyzed using a factor analysis (principal component analysis) 
procedure identical to the one used in all the previous analyses, i.e. one separate analysis for each 
of the three categories of firms. The results of these three separate analyses were put together, 
as shown in table 8.4. 
 
As shown in table 8.4, Asian manufacturing firms emerge with a factor (component 1) that seems 
strong. However, Euro-American manufacturing firms also have a strong, dominant strategy and 
practice. Although this is not as dominant as that of the Asian manufacturing firms, one may 
notice some degree of commonality between this and Asian manufacturing firms. Both the Asian 
and the Euro-American manufacturing firms put emphasis on the following elements: 
- Special corporate teams & funding to support new market entry 
- Incentives to induce managers to develop innovative businesses 
- Businesses are expected to generate a % of revenues from new products 
What distinguishes the Asian manufacturing firms from the Euro-American in terms of strategies 
and practices is that Asian manufacturing firms seem to give somewhat higher priority to: 
- New venture groups specialized in developing new internal business,  
-  R&D for finding best way of commercialization 
Euro-American manufacturing firms, in contrast, seem to give a slightly higher priority to 
encourage establishment of corporate entrepreneurship and using champions and these persons 
are nurtured in order to facilitate transfer of innovation to other business units in the firm. 
Somewhat in contrast to the Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, the dominant 
strategy and practice in  Norwegian manufacturing firms is to put emphasis on the following 
elements: 
- Strategic framework for commercialization, i.e. guidelines, plans and procedures 
- Special corporate teams & funding to support new market entry 
- New venture group specialized in developing new internal business 
The profile of the dominant practice among Norwegian manufacturing firms is more “frugal”, i.e. 
they do not give high priority to as many variables or elements as done in Asian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms. As shown in Table 8.4, Norwegian manufacturing firms seem to be 
more pluralistic in terms of strategies and practices compared to its Asian and Euro-American 
counterparts. This is seen in the number of less dominant practices, i.e. the number of 
components that emerged from the factor analysis. Looking closely at this pluralism as this 
unfolds in the various components, each component may be interpreted as “narrow” or 
“focused” in the sense that only a few aspects related to commercialization are given high 
priority, i.e. high scores. 
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The implication of the results shown in table 8.4 may be that Norwegian manufacturing firms, in 
terms of strategies and practices for commercialization, deviate from what seems to be dominant 
strategies and practices among Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. Although one 
should not ignore the possibility that this may be result of statistical artifact, one may be tempted 
to interpret this as a salient feature of how Nordic manufacturing firms set their priorities in terms 
of commercialization strategies and practices. This and related aspects will be discussed further in 
the next section. 
 
8.5 Discussion 
What has emerged from the comparative analyses presented in the sections above is that Asian, 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms differ in many aspects related to practices in 
promoting innovation and the strategies these are embedded in. According the framework of 
games of innovation (Floricel & Dougherty, 2007; Miller & Floricel, 2007), this reflects differences 
in how firms perceive and act in terms of innovation practices, i.e. how they understand the rules 
and dynamics of the innovation game they are players in. However, the results obtained from the 
analyses show that these differences are not systematic in the sense that the three categories of 
firms used in the comparative analyses always differ in a similar way. On the contrary, the picture 
that has emerged is complex, indicating that the notion of a universal “best practice” and various 
quick fixes promoted by management gurus are not congruent with the way highly innovative 
firms promote innovation in their strategies and practices. Table 8.5 is an overview of the 
dominant strategies and practices identified in the comparative analyses presented earlier in this 
chapter. 
 
The overview shown in table 8.5 provides an aggregate of the dominant practices and strategies 
in Asian, Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, based on the analyses presented 
earlier in this report. For this reason, a number of details and nuances that were presented and 
discussed earlier are not shown in the table. Still, the overview shows that the three categories of 
firms differ in many aspects. 
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Table 8.5:  Overview of dominant strategies and practices used by Asian, Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms based on the results of MINE survey 
Topic of dominant 
strategy and 
practices 
Asian firms Norwegian firms Euro-American firms 
Comparative 
dimension 
Exploration 
practices -  
exploring 
opportunities to 
innovate and 
searching for new 
ideas 
Extrovert - emphasis 
on participation in 
industry networks, 
use of external 
experts, co-operation 
with university spin-
offs, and also some 
interaction with key 
suppliers and 
customers 
Introvert - emphasis 
on using in-house 
capability, staff 
mobility, give 
resources to 
employees 
Introvert - emphasis 
on using in-house 
capability, staff 
mobility, give 
resources to 
employees, but also 
some interaction with 
key suppliers and 
customers 
Asian firms extrovert 
- Norwegian and 
Euro-American firms 
more introvert and 
pluralistic  
Decision making 
and portfolio 
management - 
management of the 
firms’ innovation 
portfolio 
Use of portfolio 
management, 
selection committees, 
priority to a few 
projects, but in 
addition 
empowerment of 
middle managers, 
project evaluation, 
use of technology and 
product roadmap 
Use of portfolio 
management, 
selection committees, 
priority to a few 
projects 
Use of portfolio 
management, 
selection committees, 
priority to a few 
projects 
Commonality all 
firms: Use of portfolio 
management, 
selection committees, 
priority to a few 
projects. Norwegian 
and Euro-American 
firms diverge in other 
aspects - more 
pluralistic, i.e. many 
different strategies 
and practices 
Policies and 
practices 
relevant for 
innovation 
projects - how 
innovation 
managers think 
about their 
innovation projects 
Emphasis on product 
development process 
(testing, prototyping, 
quality assurance, 
etc.) and use of key 
customers to test 
prototypes 
Emphasis on technical 
and market aspects of 
a project, user needs 
and feedback on the 
functioning of 
products 
Emphasis on product 
development process 
(testing, prototyping, 
quality assurance, 
etc.) and use of key 
customers to test 
prototypes 
Asian and Euro-
American firms 
similar, Norwegian 
firms diverge from 
these 
Commercialization 
practices - 
capturing values 
from 
commercialization. 
Priority to support of 
new market entry, 
incentives to 
managers, use of R&D 
function and new 
venture groups, 
business unit targets, 
policy of encouraging 
spinouts 
Use of champions and 
special corporate 
teams and new 
venture groups 
Use of champions and 
special corporate 
teams and new 
venture groups, but 
also use of R&D 
function and new 
venture groups, 
business unit targets, 
policy of encouraging 
spinouts 
Some commonality 
between Asian and 
Euro-American firms, 
but less use of 
champions in Asian 
firms. Norwegian 
firms divergent and 
pluralistic in 
comparison. 
 
In research, but also in the craft of innovation, the attention has increasingly been set on the 
initiation and finalization of innovation activities, i.e. how to elicit and select ideas for product 
development, and how these, subsequent to product development process, are commercialized. 
The product development process itself – what happens or is done in-between initiation and 
finalization – is increasingly seen as uncomplicated, although this may involve many non-trivial 
technical and design challenges. Increasingly, product development has become professionalized 
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and routinized. However, finding and selecting the “right” idea for innovation activity and 
development is seen as crucial: No matter how excellent a product development is done, a poor 
idea will result in a poor product or service, i.e. a non-innovation. Equally important, 
commercialization is viewed as crucial for creating an innovation. One aspect of this is the classic 
problem in management perspective: How to “get the prototype out of the lab and into the 
markets”. In this perspective, i.e. the importance of initiation and finalization, the practices and 
strategies shown in Table 8.5, in the rows “Exploration practice” and “Commercialization” may be 
considered as paramount. As shown in Table 8.5, there are differences between Asian, Norwegian 
and Euro-American manufacturing firms in these respects, which will now be explored and 
discussed. 
 
As already pointed out, perhaps the most clear-cut and profound difference between the three 
categories of firms may be seen in “Exploration practice”. In this, Asian manufacturing firms may 
be characterized as extrovert because they emphasize participation in industry networks, use of 
external experts and cooperation with university spin-offs. In addition, they give priority to 
interaction with key suppliers and customers. Although the latter is also a priority of Euro-
American manufacturing firms, the strategy and practice of Asian manufacturing firms may be 
interpreted as being more oriented towards sourcing opportunities outside the firm, specifically 
search or surveillance directed towards what may be interpreted as advance knowledge 
communities. In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms – and also to a great extent Euro-
American manufacturing firms – focus their attention on sources inside their firms, i.e. a practice 
and strategy of giving priority to developing the firms’ own (in-house) capability for market trend 
detection. This is aligned with a practice of moving employees around the firm (staff mobility) and 
by allocating time and other resources to the firms’ own employees. These practices are in 
accordance with what may be termed as the tenets of the “Nordic model”. However, as shown in 
detail in Table 8.1, these priorities are also shared by Euro-American manufacturing firms, which 
makes the label “Nordic model” inaccurate. Still, characterizing this as introvert may be justified, 
as a contrast to what seems to be an extrovert dominant strategy and practice of Asian 
manufacturing firms. 
 
The implication of this interpretation may be that Asian manufacturing firms are much closer to 
scientific knowledge and technological expertise and related communities outside the firms in 
their exploration of ideas for innovation, compared to its Norwegian and Euro-American 
counterparts. Because of this, one may reasonably expect Asian manufacturing firms to have a 
greater exposure to relevant scientific and technological frontiers, compared to Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms. For this reason, one may suggest that Asian manufacturing 
firms orient themselves towards searching for and obtaining advanced ideas for its innovation 
activities, more so than Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. In contrast, the latter 
seem to emphasize searching for ideas within their firms and among their own employees. This 
strategy and practice has, however, some followers among Asian manufacturing firms, but this is 
what may be termed a secondary practice or strategy, whereas in Euro-American and Norwegian 
manufacturing firms, this is dominant. 
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In general, one may suggest that Asian manufacturing firms have a dominant strategy and 
practice that increase its exposure for ideas that may be conductive to promotion of radical 
innovations. In contrast, Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms have a dominant 
strategy and practice more oriented towards exploitation activities that will lead them towards 
incremental innovation as an outcome of their introvert orientation. Following March (1991), one 
could suggest that Asian manufacturing firms are more exploration oriented, in contrast to 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms that seem more exploitation oriented. 
Because of the contrast between Asian manufacturing firms on the one side and more 
“occidental” manufacturing firms on the other, one may be tempted to ask if this divide reflect 
cultural factors, i.e. general norms and values of the society of the firms. This is an assumption in 
the theory of “innovation games” (Miller & Floricel, 2007). One may also point to framework 
conditions, e.g. industrial policy regimes in Korea and Taiwan that put great emphasis on scientific 
and technological research directed to development of an advanced industry.  
 
In commercialization, the similarities and differences are more diverse; the clear pattern observed 
in exploration practices does not appear in commercialization strategy and practice. As shown in 
table 8.5, all three categories of firms have in common that they to some extent have adopted a 
strategic approach to commercialization, although this is more pronounced in Norwegian 
manufacturing firms. Table 8.5 also shows some commonality between Norwegian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms in terms of giving priority to using champions for driving 
commercialization forward. This and the use of corporate entrepreneurship do not have high 
priority in the dominant practice and strategy of Asian manufacturing firms. Euro-American and 
Norwegian manufacturing firms are also similar because they favor use of corporate teams and 
establishment of new venture groups for commercialization, in their dominant strategy and 
practice. In their dominant practice, the R&D function in Asian manufacturing firms has a high 
priority, which is also the case for Euro-American manufacturing firms, but not Norwegian 
manufacturing firms. Asian manufacturing firms differ from Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms because they encourage middle managers to develop innovative businesses 
in their dominant practice and strategy. 
 
A salient feature of Norwegian manufacturing firms is that they use a number of different 
commercialization practices and that the dominant practice is comparatively weak. Hence, they 
may be characterized as pluralistic in terms of commercialization strategy and practice. In 
contrast, Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms appear to be more stringent. The 
stringency and cohesiveness that Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms exhibit in terms 
of their dominant commercialization strategy and practice raises the question of why Norwegian 
manufacturing firms are more pluralistic, not only in relationship to commercialization, but also in 
other domains related to innovation activities, as shown in the analyses of this report. The sample 
of Norwegian manufacturing firms is smaller than the other two categories of firms, so one could 
be tempted to suggest that the pluralism may be caused by statistical artifacts. Although this 
possibility should not be excluded, it is still hard to understand how this could impact this 
Norwegian outcome. A more plausible explanation could be that this reflects contextual factors 
such as adaptation to many different games of innovation. However, if this had been the case, 
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Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms should also have more strategic pluralism, which is 
not the case for Asian manufacturing firms and only to some degree with Euro-American 
manufacturing firms. An alternative interpretation could be that the pluralism of Norwegian 
manufacturing firms reflects what may be called a Nordic work and industrial culture in which 
autonomy is seen as an asset. Hence, Norwegian manufacturing firms have a culture that is 
conductive to fostering pluralism, and, by implication, heterogeneity in strategy. This is of course 
a sympathetic interpretation. A more critical interpretation could perhaps suggest that the 
pluralism of Norwegian manufacturing firms mirror their lack of professional skills and weakness 
of managerial leadership in terms of innovation strategy, in spite of their high degree of 
innovation and profitability. This interpretation does not necessarily contradict the first one, but 
in an increasingly competitive and globalized world economy, the pluralism of Norwegian 
manufacturing firms may not be viable. 
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9 Conclusion, discussion and policy 
implications 
9.1 Summary of findings 
In this report, the results from the analyses of data from the MINE survey have been presented in 
a comparative perspective, i.e. a comparison of Asian manufacturing firms with Norwegian and 
“Euro-American” manufacturing firms. These three categories of firms and the procedures used in 
analyses were presented and explained in chapter 2. Below, the main findings from each topic 
presented in the report will be summarized, in the following order: 
- Firm performance 
- Perception of contextual factors 
- Value creation capability of the firm 
- Innovation awareness in the organization  
- Innovation strategy processes and decision making   
- Strategies and practices for innovation, with the following sub-topics: 
o Exploration activities 
o Decision-making and portfolio management  
o Policies and practices relevant for innovation projects 
o Commercialization practices 
As explained in the introduction of this report and in chapter 2, the purpose of this report is to 
find out if Asian companies, which have enjoyed considerable success during the past decades in 
an increasingly globalized and competitive economy, differ in terms of their innovation processes 
and how they innovate – the way they think, plan and work with innovation. 
 
Firm performance  
In terms of performance, the tables presented in chapter 3 shows that the difference between the 
three categories of manufacturing firms is not large. However, within these slight variation, Asian 
manufacturing firms gave scores on their firms’ performance that were slightly better than 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms.  These differences become much less distinct 
when comparison is made of the sales growth and profitability. Asian and Norwegian firms seem 
to have obtained a higher annual growth rate over the last three years; they are in the range of 
10-20 percent annual sales growth, which is respectable and good in terms of sales growth. Still, 
in terms of net profits from sales and average return on investment (ROI), respondents from 
Norwegian firms indicate that their ROI was highest; Asian firms reported highest average net 
profits on sales over the last years, slightly more than their Norwegian counterparts. An 
assumption in the design of the MINE questionnaire is that firm performance is an outcome, i.e. 
the “dependent” variable, of all the aspects that influence the innovation processes and strategy 
of the firm. The tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show that although all firms think that they are slightly 
better than their rivals in most of the dimensions which are relevant for characterizing success in 
business – and seem to enjoy a healthy level of profitability, some differences between the firms 
seem to exist, as pointed out by the statistical amplification presented in table 3.3.  
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This gives support to the assumption of the MINE project that the firms that participated in the 
survey have good track record in terms of innovation performance – and that this has contributed 
to their profitability. Although some differences between the various categories of firms may be 
observed, the general picture is that the respondent firms are successful in an innovation 
perspective.  The question of how and why they differ in terms of innovation then becomes 
interesting in the global perspective adopted as the approach of this report. This was then the 
main topic in the rest of this report: Are there differences between the three categories, Asian, 
Norwegian and Euro-American firms in how they innovate? If so, what are these differences – and 
what do these imply in terms of the conceptual framework of games of innovation? 
 
Perception of contextual factors 
The topic of chapter 4 was how the firms that participated in the MINE survey perceived 
contextual factors, i.e. factors outside the firm that influence the firm. Factor analyses of the 
responses made show that although the differences between the three categories of firms are not 
sharp, there are nevertheless some differences which may be considered significant when 
comparing what may be termed as the dominant trend of firms, i.e. the first component that 
explains the largest percent of the variance: 
- Compared to the other categories of firms in this analysis, Asian firms emerge as more market 
oriented because they put strong emphasis on the importance of customers, users, academia 
and the technological environment of their firm. 
- In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms put greater emphasis on aspects that may be 
termed as a technology oriented outlook. 
- Euro-American firms seem more fragmented, but in their dominant trend, they emphasize 
some of the same aspects as the ones emphasized by Asian manufacturing firms.  
In attempting to interpret these observations, one may suggest that these differences indicate 
that Asian manufacturing firms are generally more extrovert in their orientation, compared to the 
other categories of firms. In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms seem to pay more attention 
and emphasize factors that may be considered as important with the technological regime that 
they belong to, i.e. a more introvert orientation. Euro-American manufacturing firms seem to be 
split between these two extremes, because they are more pluralistic.  
 
In terms of which specific factors that influence innovation in the firms and the sector they 
operate in, the contrasts observed above are not so distinct. In fact, the results obtained by the 
factor analysis indicate what may be interpreted as some degree of consensus between the three 
groups of firms. All firms seem to share a common outlook in:   
- Recognizing the importance of developing products that interconnect with other products, 
because this is considered important for creating value for their customers,  
- Recognition of technical compatibility and interworking of products with others,  
- Regulatory approval and IPR are not considered as important for the firms’ innovation 
activities,   
- The potential for economics of scale in production and the potential of harvesting economic 
benefits from process innovation is not given much emphasis, 
- Economic constraints are considered important.  
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These commonalities indicate that in these aspects, their perception of the “game of innovation” 
is uniform, however, the firms diverge in other aspects, as pointed out earlier. The results from 
the analyses indicate that Asian firms attach much importance to the dynamics of technological 
development and competition in their sector. This is seen in the number of attributes in the 
profile of Asian firms (component 1) in that they, in contrast to Norwegian manufacturing firms 
and Euro-American firms, think that their products are constantly under attack from low-cost 
substitutes – and that their rivals are continually eroding their competitive advantage and 
challenging their positions. Furthermore, they think that their sector is in the process of 
significant, unanticipated developments, which will force unpredictable transformations upon the 
sector and redefine the boundaries of this. Hence, one may interpret this as an indicator of a high 
awareness and anticipation of competition, and the potential impacts on this on the structure and 
dynamics of their sector. This type of awareness is comparatively weak in Norwegian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms. One may even be tempted to interpret this as a higher degree of 
complacency and introvert orientation. 
 
Value creation capability of the firm 
In chapter 5, the results of the factor analysis of capabilities needed for innovation were shown 
and analyzed. The results shown are interesting as cognitive maps, i.e. the importance firms 
attach to various innovation capability factors.  These showed that Asian firms, by comparison 
with the other two categories for firms, appear as more coherent in their perception of 
capabilities needed for innovation. In fact, the results suggest that Asian firms converge in one 
dominant view – and one contrasting, minority view. In contrast, Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms are much more pluralistic or diverse in what they consider as important 
innovation capabilities. Whereas Norwegian and Euro-American firms seem to put primary 
emphasis on a few capabilities, Asian emphasize numerous. In the latter, greatest emphasis is set 
on their firms’ capability to anticipate and solve customers’ problems and design solutions that 
enhance the full cycle of customer experience. Simultaneously, they put emphasis on quality of 
products, continuous introduction of novelties and product variety. These and related capabilities 
may be interpreted as Asian firms being customer focused in how they evaluate innovation 
capabilities. Asian firms also put emphasis on transforming academic research into useful 
products.  
 
In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms, in the dominant component (component 1), put 
emphasis on capabilities that may be termed as techno-economic focused, such as quality and 
reliability of products and cost reduction. Euro-American firms, in their dominant component 
(component 1), seem to emphasize what may be termed as product focused, because they attach 
highest importance to low costs of products, continuous introduction of novelties and design of 
solutions aimed at enhancing customer experience. The capability of transforming academic 
research into useful products is viewed as less important in Euro-American firms, and, to some 
extent, also in Norwegian firms, however, Asian firms consider this important.  
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Innovation awareness in the organization  
In terms of innovation awareness in the organization, which represents what may be termed as 
“innovation culture” or “innovation climate”, there are differences: Whereas Asian firms put more 
emphasis on both interpretation and identification of issues related to innovation awareness, 
Norwegian firms emphasize interpretation and formal management processes related to 
innovation awareness. In contrast, Euro-American firms had high scores on aspects that may be 
characterized as communicative and action-oriented. All firms have in common that they do not 
put much emphasis on “understanding”. One interpretation of the results presented on 
innovation awareness (table 6.1) is that Asian and Norwegian firms are similar in the emphasis 
they put on many aspects; Euro-American firms deviate for this. This may possibly be explained as 
Euro-American firms being more action-oriented and less analytical in their innovation awareness, 
compared to Asian and Norwegian firms. Asian and Norwegian firms may be interpreted as more 
analytical because of the emphasis they put on interpretation in their innovation awareness. 
However, Norwegian firms align this with formal management processes. Although Asian firms 
also seem to attach some importance to formal management processes, this is not the case for 
Euro-American firms. Asian firms align interpretation with people in the organization, instead of 
formal management processes as in Norwegian firms. The reason for this could be that Asian 
firms, to a greater extent than Norwegian and Euro-American firms, emphasize innovation 
awareness with individual employees in the organization. If valid, this contradicts the assumption 
that in Asian firms, a collectivistic corporate culture is strong, in contrast to Nordic (Norwegian) 
firms in which individualism is considered as a salient aspect of corporate or company culture.  
 
Innovation strategy processes and decision making   
In terms of innovation strategy processes and decision making, analyses in chapter 7 showed that 
all three categories are similar in many aspects: 
- Innovation is not an important item on the agenda of top management meetings in the 
firms, 
- Whether or not senior managers disagree over the best innovation strategy is not 
considered important, 
- Senior managers do not discuss strategic directions with their employees frequently,  and, 
reciprocally, employees rarely challenge senior managers’ understanding of their firm’s 
situation, 
- Firms do not create new innovation capabilities without plans or strategies, nor do people 
related to manufacturing have authority to decide NPD. 
Apart from these commonalities in the analyses of the results from this part of the survey, one 
may observe that heterogeneity is a salient aspect in terms on innovation strategy processes and 
decision making in innovative manufacturing firms. Hence, firms have a multitude of innovation 
strategy processes and modes of decision making related to this, as evident in the high number of 
components generated by the factor analysis of this topic, cf. table 7.1. Still, by comparing the 
components that had the highest percentage of variance explained (component 1), some aspects 
seem to be distinct: 
- Asian firms give NPD-teams a high degree of autonomy and power over innovation 
strategy processes and decision making – and this is also associated with alignment of 
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people who build marketing capabilities and scientific and engineering capabilities in the 
firms. 
- Euro-American firms are to some extent similar to Asian, but they do not have the 
alignment that Asian firms have made with people who build capabilities in terms of 
marketing and scientific and engineering capabilities. 
- Norwegian firms, in contrast, rely on BUs for innovation strategy processes and decision 
making – and align this with senior managers in the organization who are formally 
assigned to support innovation processes. Although this pattern is seen in the “strongest” 
component (component 1), the second strongest component (component 2) has some 
similarity with the one observed as component 1 in Euro-American firms, which points to 
the aspect of heterogeneity. 
 
Strategies and practices for innovation 
The topic of innovation strategies and practices for innovation in chapter 8 covered four topics:  
- Exploration activities 
- Decision-making and portfolio management 
- Policies and practices relevant for innovation projects 
- Commercialization practices 
Exploration activities: Perhaps the most clear-cut and profound difference between the three 
categories of firms may be seen in “Exploration practice”. In this, Asian manufacturing firms may 
be characterized as extrovert because they emphasize participation in industry networks, use of 
external experts and cooperation with university spin-offs. In addition, they give priority to 
interaction with key suppliers and customers. Although the latter is also a priority of Euro-
American manufacturing firms, the strategy and practice of Asian manufacturing firms may be 
interpreted as being more oriented towards sourcing opportunities outside the firm, specifically 
search or surveillance directed towards what may be interpreted as advance knowledge 
communities. In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms – and also to a great extent Euro-
American manufacturing firms – focus their attention on sources inside their firms, i.e. a practice 
and strategy of giving priority to developing the firms’ own (in-house) capability for market trend 
detection. This is aligned with a practice of moving employees around the firm (staff mobility) and 
by allocating time and other resources to the firms’ own employees. These practices are in 
accordance with what may be termed as the tenets of the “Nordic model”. However, as shown in 
detail in Table 8.1, these priorities are also shared by Euro-American manufacturing firms, which 
makes the label “Nordic model” less accurate. Still, characterizing this as introvert may be 
justified, as a contrast to what seems to be an extrovert dominant strategy and practice of Asian 
manufacturing firms.  
 
Decision-making and portfolio management deals with how innovative manufacturing firms 
choose and give priority to various innovation projects, i.e. what kind of guidelines or rules they 
apply for making these types of decisions. The results shown in Table 8.2 are not as clear-cut in 
terms of a contrast between Asian manufacturing firms on the one side, and Norwegian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms on the other, as observed in the topic of exploration activities. In 
 64 
fact, there are numerous aspects that are shared by all three categories of firms, indicating some 
degree of commonality in terms of decision-making and portfolio management practices and 
strategies among all the manufacturing firms that participated in the MINE survey. This 
commonality may be interpreted as shared sectorial strategies and practices for manufacturing 
industries – something that all manufacturing firms seem to put emphasis on. However, in other 
aspects, the strategies and practices seem to diverge to an extent that may seem confusing.  One 
may observe that in Asian manufacturing firms give high priority to a strategy that empower 
middle managers to reallocate funding for projects and that also evaluate projects in a portfolio 
perspective and select these according to technology and product roadmap. In Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms, these strategies and practices seem more pluralistic. This 
variety in strategies and practices could also be interpreted as Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms being less coherent in terms of their strategies and practices when they 
make decisions on portfolio and innovation activities. In general, Asian manufacturing firms 
appear to have a more cohesive approach in terms of strategies and practices for making 
decisions related to portfolio management. However, some aspects of this is shared with 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. Hence, there are some aspects that seem 
“universal”, however, in general, the Norwegian and Euro-American practices may be 
characterized as pluralistic because diversity seems to exist in terms of portfolio management and 
related priorities and decision making. For this reason, one may be tempted to interpret this as 
Asian manufacturing firms adhering to one predominant “best practice”, however, among 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms, there is greater variety in strategies and 
practices.  
 
Policies and practices relevant for innovation projects: Once firms have made the crucial decisions 
on what kind of innovation projects or activities to support – and how to support and manage 
these processes and decisions – the next step is of course how to manage the projects or 
activities. The results of the analysis (Table 8.3) suggests that Asian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms have some commonality, in contrast to Norwegian manufacturing firms. 
What emerges as dominant, in terms of strategies and practices in both Asian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms is that they is emphasis on a careful product selection process, an 
experimental approach as part  of building a prototype, use of simulation and obtaining an 
understanding of the prospective product – and, finally, that this is done in an iterative processes.  
 
In contrast, the Norwegian manufacturing firms, in their dominant strategy and practices 
(component 1), put more emphasis on mapping technical and market environment of a project, 
this being based on extensive prior classification and prioritizing of user needs – and using the 
latest modules and parts available on the market. Although these practices may be designated as 
dominant, this is weak compared to the dominant strategies and practices of Asian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms. The impression that Table 8.3 presents for Norwegian 
manufacturing firms is indeed pluralism of strategies and practices, or alternatively, what may 
also be interpreted as fragmentation.  However, in spite of these weak differences, it seems 
reasonable to characterize the dominant strategy of Asian and Euro-American manufacturing 
firms as being rigorous and experimental in terms of product development. The dominant strategy 
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of their Norwegian counterparts may be characterized as context and object oriented, the latter 
being similar to the concept of object orientation in software engineering.  
 
Commercialization practices: In their commercialization practices, both the Asian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms are similar in terms of elements that constitute their dominant 
strategy, which is comparatively strong, cohesive and comprehensive, compared to the 
Norwegian. However, there are some differences:  Asian firms believe that commercialization 
should be promoted by giving incentives that are aimed at inducing managers to develop 
innovative businesses and that businesses are expected to generate a set percentage of revenues 
from new products. In contrast, Euro-American manufacturing firms give higher priority to using 
champions and these persons are nurtured in order to facilitate transfer of innovation to other 
business units in the firm, possibly at the expense of giving less priority to incentives to induce 
managers to develop innovative businesses. The profile of the dominant practice among 
Norwegian manufacturing firms is more fragmented and frugal, i.e. they do not give high priority 
to as many variables or elements as done in Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms.  
Hence, Norwegian manufacturing firms, in terms of strategies and practices for 
commercialization, deviate from what seems to be dominant strategies and practices among 
Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. Norwegian manufacturing firms emphasize having 
a strategic framework for commercialization, i.e. guidelines, plans and procedures. This is 
combined with establishment of special corporate teams and funding to support new market 
entry and also establishment of new venture group specialized in developing new internal 
business.   
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Table 9.1: Overview - Dominant strategies and salient characteristics  
Topic Asian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Norwegian 
manufacturing 
firms 
Euro-American 
manufacturing 
firms 
Comments 
Firm performance 
(chapter 3) 
Better than rivals Better than 
rivals 
Better than rivals Asian slightly 
better overall 
performance 
Perception of 
contextual factors 
(chapter 4) 
Market oriented 
outlook, but also 
on competition 
and technological 
development 
Technology 
oriented outlook 
Market oriented 
outlook 
Euro-American 
firms not as 
market oriented as 
Asian firms 
Value creation 
capability of the firm 
(chapter 5) 
Customer 
focused 
Techno-
economic 
focused 
Product focused High degree of 
commonality 
between the firms; 
differences slight 
Innovation awareness 
in the organization 
(chapter 6) 
Interpretation 
and identification 
emphasized, 
alignment to 
individuals 
Interpretation 
and formal 
management 
processes 
emphasized 
Communicative 
and action 
oriented 
awareness 
Euro-American 
firms are distinctly 
different from 
Asian and 
Norwegian firms 
Innovation strategy 
processes and decision 
making (chapter 7) 
NPD-teams are 
given high 
autonomy and 
empowered 
BU are in charge 
of NPD 
Similar to Asian 
firms, but not so 
strong 
Commonality: 
Innovation not 
high on agendas of 
top management 
Strategies and practice 
for innovation – 
Exploration activities 
(chapter 8.1) 
Extrovert Introvert Introvert Clear-cut 
differences 
Strategies and practice 
for innovation – 
Decision-making and 
portfolio management 
(chapter 8.2) 
Empowerment of 
middle 
managers; 
emphasis on 
portfolio 
management 
Similar to Asian, 
but pluralism 
salient 
Similar to Asian, 
but pluralism 
salient 
Many aspects 
shared by all firms, 
however, 
pluralism of 
strategies salient 
Strategies and practice 
for innovation – 
Policies and practices 
(chapter 8.3) 
Rigorous and 
experimental in 
approach to PD 
Context and 
“object 
oriented” 
approach to PD 
Rigorous and 
experimental in 
approach to PD 
Many aspects 
shared – contrasts 
not so strong 
Strategies and practice 
for innovation – 
Commercialization 
practices (chapter 8.4) 
Strong, cohesive 
and 
comprehensive 
Fragmented and 
frugal 
Similar to the 
Asian, but not so 
pronounced 
Norwegian firms 
deviate 
“March scale” (March, 
1991) 
Comparatively 
exploration 
oriented 
Clearly 
exploitation 
focus 
Exploitation 
dominant, but not 
pronounced 
See discussion 
chapter 9.2 
“Ven scale” (Ven, et al., 
1999) 
More divergence 
oriented 
Convergence 
main focus 
Convergence main 
focus 
See discussion 
chapter 9.2 
“Games of Innovation-
scale”(Miller & Floricel, 
2007) 
See discussion 
chapter 9.2 
See discussion 
chapter 9.2 
See discussion 
chapter 9.2 
See discussion 
chapter 9.2 
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9.2 Discussion 
The overview presented in Table 9.1 may serve as a point of departure for discussing the findings 
of the analyses presented in the chapters of this report – and their implications. Because of its 
minimalist format, the overview does not render justice to the great variety of nuances and 
complexity of the material that has been presented; in this sense, table 9.1 is rudimentary and 
somewhat simplistic. But still, table 9.1 may serve as a device for highlighting one essential topic 
for the discussion: What are the main differences between the three categories of firms? Are 
these differences significant for explaining the modus operandi, innovativeness and success of 
Asian firms in an increasingly globalized economic system? In order to approach these issues, the 
first step will be to identify what exactly, according to the material in this report, make Asian firms 
different. 
 
Asian manufacturing firms that participated in the MINE survey differ from Norwegian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms in these aspects: 
- Asian firms exhibit a slightly better overall performance in terms of criteria used for 
business success. 
- Asian firms are more market oriented in their outlook on contextual factors, and this is 
combined with a high awareness of competition and technological development outside 
the firm. 
- Asian firms are slightly more customer focused in their understanding of the value 
creation capability of the firm. 
- In terms of innovation awareness in the organization (“innovation culture” or “innovation 
climate” in the firm), Asian firms attach this to individuals within the organization and 
their interpretations of innovation.  
- In Asian firm, NPD-teams (New Product Development teams) are given high autonomy 
and are empowered to make decisions that are related to innovation, i.e. innovation 
activities are delegated to specialist entities. 
- Asian firms may be characterized as having an extrovert outlook in their exploration 
activities, i.e. the activities related to sourcing and selection of candidates for innovation 
activities, and their attention is focused on advanced knowledge communities and experts 
outside the firm. 
- Asian firms, more so than the other two categories of firms, emphasize empowerment of 
middle managers and use of portfolio management approach in innovation activities. 
- Asian firms emphasize the importance of using a rigorous and experimental approach at 
all stages of product development in order to secure success, in their policies and 
practices related to innovation activities.  
- Asian firms, similar to Euro-American firms, appear to be strong, cohesive and 
comprehensive in terms of strategies and practice for innovation is on commercialization.  
 
As already pointed out above, perhaps the most clear-cut and profound difference between the 
three categories of firms may be seen in “Exploration practice”. In this, Asian manufacturing firms 
may be characterized as extrovert because they emphasize participation in industry networks, use 
of external experts and cooperation with university spin-offs. In addition, they give priority to 
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interaction with key suppliers and customers. Although the latter is also a priority of Euro-
American manufacturing firms, the strategy and practice of Asian manufacturing firms may be 
interpreted as being more oriented towards sourcing opportunities outside the firm, specifically 
search or surveillance directed towards what may be interpreted as advance knowledge 
communities. In contrast, Norwegian manufacturing firms – and also to a great extent Euro-
American manufacturing firms – focus their attention on sources inside their firms, i.e. a practice 
and strategy of giving priority to developing the firms’ own (in-house) capability for market trend 
detection. This is aligned with a practice of moving employees around the firm (staff mobility) and 
by allocating time and other resources to the firms’ own employees. These practices are in 
accordance with what may be termed as the tenets of the “Nordic model”. However, as shown in 
detail in Table 8.1, these priorities are also shared by Euro-American manufacturing firms, which 
makes the label “Nordic model” inaccurate. Still, characterizing this as introvert may be justified, 
as a contrast to what seems to be an extrovert dominant strategy and practice of Asian 
manufacturing firms. 
 
The implication of this interpretation may be that Asian manufacturing firms are much closer to 
scientific knowledge and technological expertise and related communities outside the firms in 
their exploration of ideas for innovation, compared to its Norwegian and Euro-American 
counterparts. Because of this, one may reasonably expect Asian manufacturing firms to have a 
greater exposure to relevant scientific and technological frontiers, compared to Norwegian and 
Euro-American manufacturing firms. For this reason, one may suggest that Asian manufacturing 
firms orient themselves towards searching for and obtaining advanced ideas for its innovation 
activities, more so than Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms. In contrast, the latter 
seem to emphasize searching for ideas within their firms and among their own employees. This 
strategy and practice has, however, some followers among Asian manufacturing firms, but this is 
what may be termed a secondary practice or strategy, whereas in Euro-American and Norwegian 
manufacturing firms, this is dominant. 
 
In general, one may suggest that Asian manufacturing firms have a dominant strategy and 
practice that increase its exposure for ideas that may be conductive to promotion of radical 
innovations. In contrast, Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms have a dominant 
strategy and practice more oriented towards exploitation activities that will lead them towards 
incremental innovation as an outcome of their introvert orientation. Following March (1991), one 
could suggest that Asian manufacturing firms are more exploration oriented, in contrast to 
Norwegian and Euro-American manufacturing firms that seem more exploitation oriented. 
Because of the contrast between Asian manufacturing firms on the one side and more 
“occidental” manufacturing firms on the other, one may be tempted to ask if this divide reflect 
cultural factors, i.e. general norms and values of the society of the firms. This is an assumption in 
the theory of “innovation games” (Miller & Floricel, 2007). One may also point to framework 
conditions, e.g. industrial policy regimes in Korea and Taiwan that put great emphasis on scientific 
and technological research directed to development of an advanced industry.  
 
In commercialization, the similarities and differences are more diverse; the clear pattern observed 
in exploration practices does not appear in commercialization strategy and practice. As shown in 
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table 8.5, all three categories of firms have in common that they to some extent have adopted a 
strategic approach to commercialization, although this is more pronounced in Norwegian 
manufacturing firms. Table 8.5 also shows some commonality between Norwegian and Euro-
American manufacturing firms in terms of giving priority to using champions for driving 
commercialization forward. This and the use of corporate entrepreneurship do not have high 
priority in the dominant practice and strategy of Asian manufacturing firms. Euro-American and 
Norwegian manufacturing firms are also similar because they favor use of corporate teams and 
establishment of new venture groups for commercialization in their dominant strategy and 
practice. In their dominant practice, the R&D function in Asian manufacturing firms has a high 
priority, which is also the case for Euro-American manufacturing firms, but not Norwegian 
manufacturing firms. Asian manufacturing firms differ from Norwegian and Euro-American 
manufacturing firms because they encourage middle managers to develop innovative businesses 
in their dominant practice and strategy. 
 
A salient feature of Norwegian manufacturing firms is that they use a number of different 
commercialization practices and that the dominant practice is comparatively weak. Hence, they 
may be characterized as pluralistic in terms of commercialization strategy and practice. In 
contrast, Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms appear to be more stringent. The 
stringency and cohesiveness that Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms exhibit in terms 
of their dominant commercialization strategy and practice raises the question of why Norwegian 
manufacturing firms are more pluralistic, not only in relationship to commercialization, but also in 
other domains related to innovation activities, as shown in the analyses of this report. The sample 
of Norwegian manufacturing firms is smaller than the other two categories of firms, so one could 
be tempted to suggest that the pluralism may be caused by statistical artifacts. Although this 
possibility should not be excluded, it is still hard to understand how this could impact this 
Norwegian outcome. A more plausible explanation could be that this reflects contextual factors 
such as adaptation to many different games of innovation. However, if this had been the case, 
Asian and Euro-American manufacturing firms should also have more strategic pluralism, which is 
not the case for Asian manufacturing firms and only to some degree with Euro-American 
manufacturing firms. An alternative interpretation could be that the pluralism of Norwegian 
manufacturing firms reflects what may be called a Nordic work and industrial culture in which 
autonomy is seen as an asset. Hence, Norwegian manufacturing firms have a culture that is 
conductive to fostering pluralism, and, by implication, heterogeneity in strategy. This is of course 
a sympathetic interpretation. A more critical interpretation could perhaps suggest that the 
pluralism of Norwegian manufacturing firms mirror their lack of professional skills and weakness 
of managerial leadership in terms of innovation strategy, in spite of their high degree of 
innovation and profitability. This interpretation does not necessarily contradict the first one, but 
in an increasingly competitive and globalized world economy, the pluralism of Norwegian 
manufacturing firms may not be viable. 
 
The interpretations and discussions above are based on a material, the MINE-survey, which does 
have limitations, as pointed out earlier in chapter 2. As such, the findings in this report should be 
treated with caution, and should not be considered as final. In fact, given the qualitative nature of 
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the empirical material and the sampling procedure, the data material has limitations in many 
directions: Statistical generalizations of the findings, although theoretically possible, have not 
been attempted because the assumptions that this would need would have been highly 
uncertain. Hence, no statistical generalizations were done.  The categories of firms that were 
made for the purpose of the analyses in this report, specifically the category “Euro-American”, 
encompass a broad range of different firms in terms of corporate and industrial culture, e.g. there 
are differences between German firms and Canadian, one would assume, and on closer 
inspection, these differences may impact the findings that were presented in this report. The 
statements that informants were asked to consider in the questionnaire may sometimes have 
been difficult to understand or relate to. In addition, the questionnaire itself was long, making 
respondent fatigue a relevant topic, because the response rates in the questionnaire were lower 
at the end of the questionnaire compared to the beginning. All these aspects and others indicate 
that one should be cautious in terms of the findings presented in this report.  
 
In spite of these precautions, the findings give support to raising new research questions for 
further research. There are two topics in the findings in this report that seem promising and 
relevant to probe further: 
- Exploration activities, i.e. the fuzzy front-end of innovation (cf. chapter 8.1), and 
- Commercialization (cf. chapter 8.4).  
A point of departure for further research could be findings presented in this report – and 
replication of the approach used in the analyses, i.e. adoption of a comparative approach. In 
trying to understand the new dynamics of innovation and competition in globalized markets, 
innovation research needs to focus on the activities and performance of Asian firms, because at 
present and in the foreseeable future, Asian firms will be the leaders of this development.   
 
9.3 Policy implications 
The analyses in this report were motivated by an interest in finding out if the success of Asian 
firms in innovation may be explained by the way these firms think, plan and work with innovation 
activities. In the increasingly globalized and competitive markets, Asian firms have achieved 
considerable success during the last century, in particular since World War II. In the pre-WWII 
years, Japanese companies pioneered this in a number of product domains, e.g. in textile 
manufacturing industry. During the last decades, firms from People’s Republic of China, Korea and 
Taiwan have also become highly successful in the global markets – and many of these are highly 
innovative and technologically sophisticated, both in terms of product innovation, but also in 
process innovation, the latter explaining why the Asians often are able to produce at lower prices 
and higher quality.  
 
The material and analyses presented in this report suggest that Asian manufacturing firms differ 
from their Norwegian and Euro-American counterparts in some aspects that are important in 
terms of innovation strategy and practices. Hence, one may ask if the findings presented in this 
report may contribute to a more satisfactory explanation of the success of Asian firms. The 
cautious interpreter of the findings would answer “no”. As pointed out in chapter 4 on firm 
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performance, Asian firms are slightly more successful in terms of business success. Hence, one 
may plausibly suggest that the findings merely show that there are numerous ways of obtaining 
success, i.e. a multitude of styles of playing the innovation game are feasible and successful. The 
number of components generated by the factor analyses would provide support to this type of 
interpretation. 
 
Still, this is not a satisfactory explanation. The success of Asian firms begs for an explanation. 
Asian firms have been able to outcompete its rivals elsewhere because they are more innovative. 
Hence, there is “something” they do which somehow contributes to their competitive advantage 
in terms of innovation. The analyses in this report have identified a number of differences in the 
way Asian firms think, plan and act in terms of innovation activities. It seems fair to assume, given 
the success of Asian firms, that these distinct aspects somehow explain a more viable and 
successful strategy in terms long-term success. Exploration activities (cf. chapter 8.1) is perhaps 
the most clear-cut and strategically significant difference between Asian firms on the one hand, 
and Norwegian and Euro-American firms on the other hand. As explained earlier, this indicates 
that Asian firms put higher priority on sourcing advance knowledge outside their firms, hence, 
they are more extrovert, compared to their counterparts (and competitors) in Norway and the 
countries from which the Euro-American firms come from. Secondly, Asian firms put high trust on 
their own, specialized experts, such as R&D and NPD-teams; these are empowered and given a 
high degree of autonomy. In Norwegian firms, the business units (BUs) have control over NPD. 
This way of organizing innovation and related activities has a bias towards conservatism and 
status-quo, as many analysts have pointed out (Roussel, Saad, & Kash, 1991; Tirpak, et al., 2006), 
although it provides numerous, more short-term advantages in terms of spending and costs. 
Hence, in the long run, the Asian mode of innovation activities has many of the attributes 
associated with March’s concept of exploration (March, 1991). According to March, exploration as 
a strategy is risky and will fail in the long run, which makes exploitation the winner by default. 
March supports to his prediction, not by empirical evidence, but from findings generated by a 
computer based simulation exercise. However, the successes of Asian firms seem to contradict 
March, raising the academically interesting question of the predictive powers of this type of 
simulation: Maybe there is something wrong with the assumptions that were put into the model? 
However, March’s pessimistic prediction about exploration accords well with how many business 
school trained managers, economists and policy makers think about technology development and 
innovation. However, the success of Asian firms and their inclination towards a strategy of 
exploration may explain how they have succeeded. 
 
Translating the findings in this report into policy advice is of course difficult. Following the 
cautious interpretation presented initially, there is really little to learn from the analyses in this 
report: Apart from observing that although some types of strategies and practices are has 
stronger support than others, pluralism is also strong. However, if policy makers in a country like 
Norway become convinced that Asian firms are successful because they are more exploration 
oriented and because of all the other attributes that make their way of doing innovation different 
from its competitors, then this should be translated into policy measures and instruments that 
give firms incentives to act more like Asian firms. To some extent this may be done by designing 
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framework conditions that encourage firms to become more explorative. Norwegian society is in 
a unique position to encourage firms to become “more Asian” because the state is a major owner 
of private sector firms in Norway. The governance of this substantial ownership is now done by an 
arm’s length, laissez-faire policy, i.e. the state has a passive role – and this is justified as a 
“professional” approach and operationalized by appointing officers to sit on boards, etc. of these 
private sector companies, basically as observers, i.e. they are expected to be passive. This is 
different from the role of government in Asian countries in its relationship to private sector 
companies, in particular on matters related to R&D and technology development.  
 
The Norwegian government’s current “ownership policy” should be reconsidered, asking what 
should be done to make the companies owned or controlled by Norwegian society more 
innovation oriented and more successful in innovation activities? The findings in this report 
suggest that Asian companies do this in ways that are different from Norwegian and Euro-
American companies. Policy should encourage development of strategies and practices that make 
Asian companies successful and competitive in the globalized markets. Unfortunately, in the 
present, somewhat complacent policy climate and ideological hegemonies that prevail, hoping for 
this type of policy rejuvenation would perhaps be utopian, however, if Asian firms continue to 
outcompete all others, then policy may be forced to reconsider, if they are capable of this mode 
of thinking. This may imply throwing away the political blinkers that policy makers are using now. 
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Appendix 1: Calculation of statistical significance 
for firm performance 
Table 3.1 shows the results of a statistical exercise designed to identify in which areas there are 
statistically significant differences between the three categories of firms in terms of the 
dimensions explored in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. In each column in Table 3.3 we compare the 
mean values of the firm performance variables in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. We see for example from 
Table 3.1 that the mean value of the number of spin-offs and start-ups generated through 
innovation among Asian firms (4.4) is higher than the corresponding mean value among 
Norwegian firms (3.5). The question is whether the difference is significant or not? In the 
following we will use this firm performance variable as an example. 
 
The fundamental question for this firm performance variable is whether the mean value of the 
number of spin-offs and start-ups generated through innovation is higher among the population 
of Asian firms than among the population of Norwegian firms? Suppose that this mean value for 
the population of Asian firms is 𝜇𝑋, and that this mean value for the population of Norwegian 
firms is 𝜇𝑌. We are interesting in making inferences about the population parameters (𝜇𝑋, 𝜇𝑌). 
The question is whether we have the inequality 𝜇𝑋 > 𝜇𝑌 or not, i.e. whether this mean value for 
the population of Asian firms is higher than the corresponding value for the population of 
Norwegian firms? 
 
In this case, however, we can only making inferences about these population parameters from an 
analysis of the sample data. Here we will use the method described in Bhattacharyya and Johnson 
(1977, Section 9.2) for independent random samples from the populations. The method can be 
described as follows: Suppose for this firm performance variable that we have the observations 
𝑋1,𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑛 for a sample of size 𝑛 from the population of Asian firms (where the mean value of 
this firm performance variable is denoted by 𝜇𝑋), and the observations 𝑌1,𝑌2, … ,𝑌𝑛 for a sample 
of size 𝑚 from the population of Norwegian firms (where the mean value of this firm performance 
variable is denoted by 𝜇𝑌). I.e., 𝑋𝑖  is what respondent 𝑖 among the sample of Asian firms 
answered about how many spin-offs and start-ups which were generated through innovation (𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑛), 𝑌𝑗 is what respondent 𝑗 among the sample of Norwegian firms answered about 
the corresponding number of spin-offs and start-ups (𝑗 = 1,2, … ,𝑚), 𝑛 is the total number of 
respondents among the sample of Asian firms who answered this question, and 𝑚 is the total 
number of respondents among the sample of Norwegian firms who answered this question. In 
this case 𝑛 = 141 and 𝑚 = 37. The mean value of the observations 𝑋1,𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑛 from the 𝑛 
Asian firms is 𝑋� = (1/𝑛)∑ 𝑋𝑖 = 4.4𝑛𝑖=1 , and the mean value of the observations 𝑌1,𝑌2, … ,𝑌𝑛 from 
the 𝑚 Norwegian firms is 𝑌� = (1/𝑚)∑ 𝑌𝑖 = 3.5𝑚𝑗=1 . The question is whether 𝜇𝑋 > 𝜇𝑌 holds or 
not? We see that 𝑋� = 4.4 is larger than 𝑌� = 3.5, but the question is whether the difference is 
significant or not, and therefore whether we can claim that 𝜇𝑋 > 𝜇𝑌 holds? 
 
Note that an important requirement for such a comparison between the population parameters 
𝜇𝑋 and 𝜇𝑌 is that the observations 𝑋1,𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑛 is a random sample (of size 𝑛) from the 
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population of Asian firms, and that the observations 𝑌1,𝑌2, … ,𝑌𝑛 is a random sample (of size 𝑚) 
from the population of Norwegian firms. A similar requirement must be satisfied for all the 
comparisons between the population parameters for the scores in Table 3.3. This requirement 
would not be satisfied if each of the three populations (Asian, Norwegian and Euro-American 
firms) covered all the firms in the region. However, in our case we have a strategic sample of firms 
from each of the populations. Each population therefore consists of the most innovative firms, 
and since each of the samples is approximately randomly drawn from this population, we can 
assume that this requirement will be satisfied. 
 
Another important requirement is that the observations 𝑋1,𝑋2, … ,𝑋𝑛 from the population of 
Asian firms are independent of the observations 𝑌1,𝑌2, … ,𝑌𝑛 from the population of Norwegian 
firms. More generally, we have to assume that the responses from the Asian firms are unrelated 
to the responses from the Norwegian firms, which is satisfied for all firm performance variables in 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
These are the only assumptions required when the sample sizes 𝑛 and 𝑚 are both large.18 An 
approximate 100(1 − 𝛼)% confidence interval for 𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌, for large sample inferences for 
𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌, is given by 
 
𝑋� − 𝑌� ± 𝑧𝛼/2�𝑆𝑋2𝑛 + 𝑆𝑌2𝑚 , 
 
where 𝑧𝛼/2 is the upper 𝛼/2 point in 𝑁(0,1), and 𝑆𝑋2 = (1/(𝑛 − 1))∑ (𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋�)2𝑛𝑖=1  and 
𝑆𝑌
2 = (1/(𝑚 − 1))∑ (𝑌𝑗 − 𝑌�)2𝑚𝑗=1  are the sample variances for Asian and Norwegian firms, 
respectively. We want to test the null hypothesis 𝐻0: 𝜇𝑋 = 𝜇𝑌against the alternative hypothesis 
𝐻1: 𝜇𝑋 ≠ 𝜇𝑌. Alternatively, we could test either against the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: 𝜇𝑋 > 𝜇𝑌 
(which is more relevant in this case) or the alternative hypothesis 𝐻1: 𝜇𝑋 < 𝜇𝑌, but our alternative 
hypothesis 𝐻1: 𝜇𝑋 ≠ 𝜇𝑌 is of course more general. In testing this null hypothesis, the test statistic 
is: 
 
𝑍 = 𝑋� − 𝑌�
�𝑆𝑋
2
𝑛 + 𝑆𝑌2𝑚 , 
 
which has approximately a 𝑁(0,1) distribution under the null hypothesis. We find that 
𝑍 = −3.306 for the mean value of the number of spin-offs and start-ups generated through 
innovation, and therefore the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 % level (i.e. the level 𝛼 = 0.01 =1%) in favour of the alternative hypothesis. We have therefore marked the cell with “1 %” for this 
firm performance score in the column “Significance level” in Table 1. 
                                                          
18  Bhattacharyya and Johnson  (1977, p. 295) emphasize that when both sample sizes 𝑛 and 𝑚 are 
greater than 25 or 30, which is satisfied for all firm performance scores in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the 
assumptions concerning small samples can be greatly relaxed. When both sample sizes are small, we 
also have to assume that both population distributions are normal, and that the population variances 
are equal. 
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Table 1: Comparison of scores made by responding firms, statistical significance 
How well is your firm 
doing, relative to 
competitors, in each 
of the following 
areas? Sales growth 
and profitability? 
Difference Asian-
Norwegian firms 
Difference Asian-
Euro-American 
firms 
Difference Norwegian-
Euro-American firms 
Scale: 1=Worse than 
rivals; 4=About 
equal; 7=Better than 
rivals 
Significance 
level 
satisfied at 
1 or 5 % 
Level at 1 
or 5 %? 
Significance 
level 
satisfied at 
1 or 5 % 
Level 
at 1 or 
5 %? 
Significance 
level 
satisfied at 
1 or 5 % 
Level at 1 
or 5 %? 
Growth rate of firm 
(or of the relevant 
SBU used in the 
survey)   No 
  No  No 
Creation of 
customer value 
through innovation   No 
5 % Yes  No 
Number of new 
businesses 
generated through 
innovation   No 
5 % Yes  No 
Number of spin-offs 
and start-ups 
generated through 
innovation 1 % Yes 
1 % Yes  No 
Frequency of major 
new products 
releases 5 % Yes 
  No  No 
Proportion of 
revenues generated 
through new 
products   No 
  No  No 
Scale: 1=Negative; 
2=0-5%; 3=5-10%, 
4=10-20%; 5=20-
40%; 6=40% and 
over     
      
Average annual sale 
growth over the last 
3 years   No 1 % Yes 5 % Yes 
Average net profit 
on sales over the last 
3 years   No 1 % Yes  No 
Average return on 
investment (ROI) 
over the last 3 years 10 % 
Yes, 
higher 5 % Yes 1 % Yes 
 
Alternatively, we may establish a confidence interval for the difference in the population mean 
scores, 𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌. An approximate 100(1− 𝛼)% = 99% confidence interval for 𝜇𝑋 − 𝜇𝑌  is (−1.570,−0.195), where 𝑧𝛼/2 = 𝑧0.01/2 = 𝑧0.005 = 2.575. Since the confidence interval does 
not include zero, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 1 % level in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis. We therefore claim that the mean value of the number of spin-offs and start-ups 
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generated through innovation is higher among the population of Asian firms than among the 
population of Norwegian firms. Similar calculations may be established for all the other firm 
performance variables in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, and Table 3.3 shows the conclusions from these 
calculations. 
 
An assumption in the design of the MINE questionnaire is that firm performance is an outcome, 
i.e. the “dependent” variable, of all the aspects that influence the innovation processes and 
strategy of the firm. The tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 show that although all firms think that they are 
slightly better than their rivals in most of the dimensions which are relevant for characterizing 
success in business – and seem to enjoy a healthy level of profitability, some differences between 
the firms seem to exist, as pointed out by the statistical amplification presented in Table 3.1.  
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Appendix 2: MINE survey questionnaire  
 
  
 




























  
 
  
 
